HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY I: ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

Shellbourne Conference Center, July MMX
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This course explores the thinkers and doctrines of classical Greek and Roman philosophy from its emergence in the VIII century B.C. to its early contacts with Christianity. To understand why and how philosophy came into existence in a cultural world dominated by poetic mythology and the codified legal norms, it will be necessary to take into account the geographical, literary, social, political, religious, and scientific contexts of the ancient world. Eventually serious inquiry into human and divine realities formed the self-consciously distinct enterprise known as “φιλοσοφία – philosophia,” or love of wisdom.

Ancient Greek philosophy is traditionally divided into pre-Socratic and post-Socratic periods, thus indicating the centrality of an enigmatic, quasi-mystical figure who provided the catalytic presence for a mature burst of philosophical energy in Plato and Aristotle. The traditions of inquiry they began were to continue orienting philosophy for two and a half millennia. Consequently, the course gives them primary attention, following a brief look at their predecessors and concluding with another brief look at the other ancient schools inspired by Socrates in Greece and the Hellenistic schools of Rome.

Since later philosophers stand on the shoulders of their predecessors, it is necessary to take note of the specific contributions the ancient thinkers made to later periods that made greater contributions to the development of philosophy and theology (especially in influencing the Patristic and Medieval foundations of Christian culture). Then, too, the Greeks and Romans played an important role in preparing the early Christians for an evangelizing mission that required the harmonizing of faith and reason (πίστις καὶ λόγος: fides et ratio).

A Journey in Search of Truth: A Prologue from John Paul II

(a paraphrase of Fides et Ratio, 24-27)

24. Philosophy, along with literature and all the arts of creative intelligence, has recognized and articulated the universal human desire and urgent quest for God that begins with reason’s capacity to move beyond contingency toward the infinite. The Church has always treasured this intimate nostalgia for the “unknown God” whom St. Paul proclaimed in Athens (Acts 17:22-27; see also the Church’s prayer for non-believers in the Liturgy of Good Friday).

25. The proper object of this universal desire is knowledge of real truth, not mere opinions about things: both theoretical truth about the objective reality of things, and practical truth that looks to the good to be performed as the path to happiness and perfection (see Veritatis Splendor). Human maturity is attained when a person is
able to distinguish the true from the false, not by turning inward, but by opening to the transcendent.

26. Doubts occasioned by the experience of suffering and of apparently inexplicable facts, together with the absolute certainty of death as something inevitable, give rise to the most basic and unavoidable of all questions: What is the meaning and destiny of life? The death of Socrates, for example, gave to philosophy one of its most decisive orientations by posing the dramatic question of human immortality: Is there an afterlife or not?

27. Ever since then, philosophers have sought to discover and articulate one ultimate answer, a universal and final explanation, a certitude beyond all doubt that can serve as a ground of all partial truths, a supreme value that refers to nothing beyond itself and puts an end to further questioning. This search is encountered in personal “philosophies” of life, as well as in the various systems and schools of thought.

B. The Different Faces of Human Truth

28. Man defined as “the one who seeks truth” can never ground his life on doubt, uncertainty, or deception; in spite of the natural limitations of reason, the inconstancy of the heart, and a tendency to flee from it out of fear of its demands, truth always influences human life, even if it is often obscured, distorted, and evaded.

29. Everyday life confirms the fact that men can arrive at the truth. The search for it is deeply rooted in human nature and presumes an initial confidence in the possibility of completing it: The intuition that an answer awaits us is what leads to asking the first question, both in the persistent quest for scientific explanations of phenomena and with respect to the fundamental or ultimate questions to which many men have attained substantially the same answers.

30. Truth is accessible through evidence and experimentation (both in everyday life and in scientific research), through exercise of the speculative powers of the intellect (in philosophy), and through religious traditions. Together, these modes of knowing enable everyone to develop his own comprehensive view of life as a guide to interpreting its meaning and regulating behavior.

33. In sum, the human search for truth can end only in reaching the Absolute, because it is ultimately the search for a Person to whom we can entrust ourselves in sincere friendship (n. 28: This theme, long developed by the Pope, is succinctly expressed in the General Audience of 19 Oct. 1983). Moving beyond simple belief, Christian Faith offers the possibility of reaching the goal because it immerses us in the order of Grace, wherein we can share in the Mystery of Christ and through it a true and coherent knowledge of the Triune God. All of this is impeded by the contemporary climate of suspicion and distrust, which ignores the ancient wisdom about friendship as the best context for philosophical inquiry.

35. These broad considerations have prepared us to explore more directly the relationship between the two orders of knowledge, revealed truth and philosophy—first by examining the links between them in the course of history.

Course Outline
1 – *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*. Its relevance as a philosophical discipline; its relationship to other philosophical disciplines that study human culture, science, morality, religion; its division into specific historical periods; its treatment of specific thinkers, schools, systems of thought; its critical component, with reference to the truth of knowledge accessible to human reason.

2 – *Introduction to ancient philosophy*. Its significance in the history of philosophy and world history; its division into specific sub-periods; the Greco-Roman or Classical period as historical and cultural concept; conditions favorable for the emergence of philosophy in ancient Greece; brief comparison with more ancient oriental schools of thought; overview of course materials and procedure.

**PART I: PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY**

3 – *Four centuries from Hesiod to Socrates*. Asia Minor: Ionian speculators (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes); Xenophanes and Heraclitus—early physical and metaphysical problems; Mediterranean Europe: the Pythagoreans and Empedocles; the Eleatics (Parmenides and Zeno)—mathematical and epistemological problems; the first Athenian philosophers: Anaxagoras and the Atomists—Leucippus, Democritus—early skepticism and pluralism.

4 – *Socrates and his milieu in the Athens recorded by Thucydides*. The turn from speculation about the macrocosm of physical nature to the microcosm of human nature: the Sophists and their schools of rhetoric (Protagoras, Gorgias); how Socrates did philosophy (dialogical challenges to sophistic relativism and utilitarianism in the search for truth); the opposition aroused by this revolutionary new beginning; introducing four centuries of Socratic influence.

**PART II: POST-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY—PLATO AND ARISTOTLE**

5 – *Students of Socrates, Plato chief among them*. The trial and death of Socrates and its impact on his followers; the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues; contrasting portraits of Socrates by Aristophanes and Xenophon; the friends and enemies of Socrates in the history of philosophy.
6 – Emergence of Plato’s philosophical vocation and the story of his career. Traveler and seeker after knowledge; an autobiographical account: the Seventh Letter; Plato’s school: an Academy for the philosophical formation of statesmen; Plato’s teaching method and concept of philosophy (διαλεκτική) as quest for the (είδος) of each thing: what is serious and what is playful in Plato’s “philosophical poetry.” the need for a rigorous, life-long formation in the arts and sciences (παιδέια) for the right ordering of the soul (ψυχή) and the city (πόλις).

7 – The sum of Platonic philosophy and its subsequent influence. In mathematics, logic and epistemology; in metaphysics, cosmology and psychology; in anthropology, ethics and politics; in rhetoric, aesthetics and theology; the leading disciples of Plato and the subsequent career of the Academy; Plato’s influence on early Christianity and throughout the history of philosophy; “Platonism” and “Neo-Platonism.”

Reading: Plato, Gorgias (trans. Benjamin Jowett), the opening dialogue:

CALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast.
SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast?
CALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been exhibiting to us many fine things.
SOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.
CHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other time.
CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon — does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?
CHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming.
CALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he shall exhibit to you.
SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes and teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest, defer the exhibition to some other time.
CALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he would answer.
SOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon —?
CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him?
SOCRATES: Ask him who he is.
CHAEREPHON: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?
CHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions which you are asked?
GORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; and I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a new one.
CHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.
GORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.
POLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is tired.
CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias?
POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?
CHAEREPHON: Not at all—and you shall answer if you like.
POLUS: Ask:—
CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is given to his brother?
POLUS: Certainly.
CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician?
POLUS: Yes.
CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?
POLUS: Clearly, a painter.
CHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him — what is the art in which he is skilled.
POLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest.
SOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.
GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he was asked.
GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself?
SOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer: for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.
POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.
POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?
SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you briefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question—what are we to call you, and what is the art which you profess?
GORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.
SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician?
GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in Homeric language, 'I boast myself to be.'
SOCRATES: I should wish to do so.
GORGIAS: Then pray do.
SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians?
GORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, but in all places.
SOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?

GORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as any one.

SOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time.

GORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man use fewer words.

SOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the making of garments?

GORGIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?

GORGIAS: It is.

SOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.

GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.

SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?

GORGIAS: With discourse.

SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?— such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?

GORGIAS: No.

SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?

GORGIAS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?

GORGIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak?

GORGIAS: Of course.

SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?

GORGIAS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse?

GORGIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases?

GORGIAS: Just so.

SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?

GORGIAS: Very true.

SOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:— all of them treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to do.

GORGIAS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art that treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

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8 – Plato’s most important student: Aristotle. The life and development of Aristotle’s career: experience (εµπειρία) of nature as the root of philosophical science; departure from the Academy; elaboration of a new philosophical method based on observation and demonstration: the Organon; establishment
of a “Peripatetic” school in the Lyceum for the application of logic (analytics) and epistemology to all the disciplines of human knowledge and experience.

9 – Outline of Aristotle’s science of philosophy (ἐπιστήµη): the treatises. Foundation of Aristotle’s philosophical realism in the investigation of nature (φύσις); division of knowledge: knowing (speculative, or theoretical philosophy—θεορία), doing (practical philosophy—πράξις), making (applied philosophy—ποίεσις); the corpus of Aristotle’s treatises, their composition, and subsequent history.

10 – Theoretical philosophy. First philosophy (ontology, metaphysics), being and existence, permanence, causation (material, formal, effective, final), the first (uncaused) cause (God); the created universe: inanimate beings (physics and cosmology), change; animate beings (biology and psychology), soul.

11 – Practical and applied philosophy. The human being, as individual and as communitarian (ethics and politics): the good for man; virtues, vices, and the mean; a new science of the polis; making persuasive and beautiful speeches (rhetoric and poetics).

12 – The Aristotelian Legacy. His successors at the Lyceum (beginning with Theophrastus); history of the Peripatetic school in the ancient world; Aristotle’s principal contributions to the history of philosophy (especially in the Middle Ages)—“Aristotelianism.”

Reading: Aristotle, Metaphysics (trans. W. D. Ross), I, i and ii: i

ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things.

By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not in others. And therefore the former are more intelligent and apt at learning than those which cannot remember; those which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent though they cannot be taught, e.g. the bee, and any other race of animals that may be like it; and those which besides memory have this sense of hearing can be taught.

The animals other than man live by appearances and memories, and have but little of connected experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasoning. Now from memory experience is produced in men; for the several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. And experience seems pretty much like science and art, but really science and art come to men through experience; for ‘experience made art’, as Polus says, ‘but inexperience luck.’ Now art arises when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about a class of objects is produced. For to have a judgment that when
Callias was ill of this disease this did him good, and similarly in the case of Socrates and in many individual cases, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it has done good to all persons of a certain constitution, marked off in one class, when they were ill of this disease, e.g. to phlegmatic or bilious people when burning with fevers—this is a matter of art.

With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and men of experience succeed even better than those who have theory without experience. (The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with the individual; for the physician does not cure man, except in an incidental way, but Callias or Socrates or some other called by some such individual name, who happens to be a man. If, then, a man has the theory without the experience, and recognizes the universal but does not know the individual included in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the individual that is to be cured.) But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience (which implies that Wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge); and this because the former know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the ‘why’ and the cause. Hence we think also that the master-workers in each craft are more honorable and know in a truer sense and are wiser than the manual workers, because they know the causes of the things that are done (we think the manual workers are like certain lifeless things which act indeed, but act without knowing what they do, as fire burns—but while the lifeless things perform each of their functions by a natural tendency, the laborers perform them through habit); thus we view them as being wiser not in virtue of being able to act, but of having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes. And in general it is a sign of the man who knows and of the man who does not know, that the former can teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience is; for artists can teach, and men of mere experience cannot.

Again, we do not regard any of the senses as Wisdom; yet surely these give the most authoritative knowledge of particulars. But they do not tell us the ‘why’ of anything—e.g. why fire is hot; they only say that it is hot.

At first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the common perceptions of man was naturally admired by men, not only because there was something useful in the inventions, but because he was thought wise and superior to the rest. But as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the necessities of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. Hence when all such inventions were already established, the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered, and first in the places where men first began to have leisure. This is why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure.

We have said in the Ethics what the difference is between art and science and the other kindred faculties; but the point of our present discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things; so that, as has been said before, the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive. Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes.

Since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles, the knowledge of which is Wisdom. If one were to take the notions we have about the wise man, this might perhaps make the answer more evident. We suppose first, then, that the wise man knows all things, as far as possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them in
detail; secondly, that he who can learn things that are difficult, and not easy for man to know, is wise (sense-perception is common to all, and therefore easy and no mark of Wisdom); again, that he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge; and that of the sciences, also, that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of Wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of Wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey him.

Such and so many are the notions, then, which we have about Wisdom and the wise. Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under the universal. And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; for they are farthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry. But the science which investigates causes is also instructive, in a higher degree, for the people who instruct us are those who tell the causes of each thing. And understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable (for he who chooses to know for the sake of knowing will choose most readily that which is most truly knowledge, and such is the knowledge of that which is most knowable); and the first principles and the causes are most knowable; for by reason of these, and from these, all other things come to be known, and not these by means of the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the causes.

That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers. For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end. And this is confirmed by the facts; for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another’s, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake.

Hence also the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power; for in many ways human nature is in bondage, so that according to Simonides ‘God alone can have this privilege’, and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the divine power, it would probably occur in this case above all, and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate. But the divine power cannot be jealous (nay, according to the proverb, ‘bards tell a lie’), nor should any other science be thought more honorable than one of this sort. For the most divine science is also most honorable; and this science alone must be, in two ways, most divine. For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities; for (1) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2)
such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better.

Yet the acquisition of it must in a sense end in something which is the opposite of our original inquiries. For all men begin, as we said, by wondering that things are as they are, as they do about self-moving marionettes, or about the solstices or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side; for it seems wonderful to all who have not yet seen the reason, that there is a thing which cannot be measured even by the smallest unit. But we must end in the contrary and, according to the proverb, the better state, as is the case in these instances too when men learn the cause; for there is nothing which would surprise a geometer so much as if the diagonal turned out to be commensurable.

We have stated, then, what is the nature of the science we are searching for, and what is the mark which our search and our whole investigation must reach.

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PART III: POST-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY—HELLENISTIC SCHOOLS

13 – Eclecticism of Greek philosophy: IV to II centuries B.C. Xenocrates and the Old Academy; Antisthenes and Diogenes (Cynics); Aristippus (Cyrenaics); Epicurus and Socratic Epicureanism; Pyrrho, Arcesilaus, and the Skepticism of the Middle Academy.

14 – Attempts at Renewal: First Century B.C. Zeno, Cleanthes, and the subsequent development of Stoicism; Chrysippus, Carneades and the Third, or New Academy; Rivalry of Academics and Peripatetics; Andronicus of Rhodes and the editing of Aristotle’s treatises; the shift of philosophy from Greece to Rome.

15 – Hellenization of Roman intellectual life. Roman Epicureanism (Lucretius); Roman stoicism: its influence in the thought of Cicero; its development in Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius; the scepticism of Sextus Empiricus.

16 – The Neo-Platonic Movement. Impact of Platonism on Jewish thinkers in the Roman world: Philo of Alexandria; mysticism and religious thought in the system of Plotinus; the Neo-Platonic schools of Porphyry and Proclus.

17 – The impact of Greco-Roman philosophy on early Christian thought. The mixed reputation of philosophers among the first Christians: St. Paul, Tertullian, St. Justin, Origen; steering a course between Judaizers and Hellenizers; the challenge of rival cults, mystery religions, and gnostic influences.

JOHN PAUL II (paraphrased), continuation:

FIDES ET RATIO, CHAPTER FOUR: The Relationship between Faith and Reason
A. Important Moments in the Encounter of Faith and Reason

36. Because of errors about God which are endemic to cosmic religious myths and mystery cults, St. Paul and the first Christian evangelists—and later the Fathers of the Church as well—drew upon the Greek philosophers who had sought to cleanse from the natural knowledge of God the polytheism, idolatry, and superstition found in popular beliefs of the time. By searching for a rational foundation for their belief in the divinity, the ancient philosophers had brought to light for the first time the link between reason and religion.

37. St. Irenaeus and Tertullian, among early Christian thinkers, were also careful not to confuse authentic philosophy with a presumed higher knowledge reserved for the select few—a subordination of revealed truth to Gnostic interpretations (unfortunately still widespread today among believers who lack a proper critical sense).

38. St. Justin and St. Clement of Alexandria pioneered this cautious discernment of the early Christians’ positive engagement with Greek philosophy for the purpose of defending and deepening faith in the risen Christ and leading their listeners to conversion of heart. Today’s Christian apologists continue to reject, as the Fathers did, a philosophical elitism that would impede equal access to the truth for all men and women, and they continue to embrace any philosophical paths that can prepare for the Revelation of Christ.

39. Another outstanding example of early Christian thinkers who made use of philosophy while distinguishing it from contemporary intellectual currents is Origen, who adopted Platonic arguments in countering attacks and constructing an early form of Christian theology—a term (rational discourse about God) which already signified the summit of philosophy for Aristotle. Now it came to mean reflections that express the true doctrine about God. In the minds of the first Christian theologians, Platonic thought began to undergo significant changes.

40. The Christianizing of neo-Platonic thought was led by the Cappadocian Fathers (St. Basil and the two Gregories), Dionysius the Areopagite, and especially St. Augustine, who found the philosophers he had studied powerless to lead him to the whole truth. After his conversion, he went on to produce the first great synthesis of philosophy and theology that was to sustain the West for many centuries, and to presage future developments in several philosophical currents.

Benedit XVI (digested)

GENERAL AUDIENCES: On the Early Fathers of the Church
Mar. 21 to May 2, 2007

ST. JUSTIN MARTYR (100-165)

...For a long time he searched for truth, passing through the various schools of traditional Greek philosophy. Finally—as he himself says in the first chapters of his “Dialogue with Trypho”—a mysterious stranger, an old man he met on the beach—initially unsettles Justin by showing him that it is impossible for a person to satisfy the desire for the divine with human powers alone. Then this man pointed to the ancient prophets as the ones who could show Justin the path to God and “true philosophy.”... The story symbolizes a crucial moment in Justin's life: At the end of a long philosophical journey in search of truth, he found Christianity. He then established a school in Rome, where (without charge) he initiated students into the new religion, which he considered the true philosophy. In this religion he had found the truth and, therefore, the way to live rightly....

His two “Apologies” and the “Dialogue with Trypho” are his only works still extant. In them Justin aims above all to show the divine projects of creation and of salvation brought about by Christ, the “Logos” (that is, the eternal Word, eternal Reason, creative Reason: λόγος). Everyone, as a rational creature, participates in this “Logos,” carrying within himself a “seed,”
and can perceive glimmers of truth. In this way, that very “Logos,” who had revealed himself as a prophetic image to the Jews in the Old Covenant, had also partially revealed himself, as “seeds of truth,” in Greek philosophy…. If the Old Testament tends toward Christ, in the same way…Greek philosophy tends toward Christ and the Gospel…. Justin adds that these two (the Old Testament and Greek philosophy) are like two roads leading to Christ, the “Logos.”

This is why Greek philosophy cannot be opposed to evangelical truth, and Christians may confidently draw from it, as if it were their own…. On the whole, the person and work of Justin mark the ancient Church’s decisive option for philosophy instead of pagan religions because it is based in reason…. Justin harshly criticized the pagan religious myths, which he considered diabolical “disorientations” on the path to truth. Instead, philosophy was the privileged meeting place for paganism, Judaism, and Christianity…. For Justin, and the other Christian apologists, Christ was the God of the philosophers, not the false pagan gods. It was a choice for the truth of being versus the myth of traditions…. In an age such as ours, marked by relativism in the debate on values and on religion…this is a lesson that should not be forgotten. I will conclude with the words of the mysterious old man Justin found by the sea: “You, above all, pray that the doors of light be opened to you. For no one can see nor understand if God and his Christ do not give him understanding” (Dial. 7,3).

ST. IRENAEUS OF LYONS (137-203)

Though he was born in Smyrna (Asia Minor), where he attended the school of the bishop, St. Polycarp, he is associated with the first development of the Christian community of Gaul, for by 177 he was among the priests of Lyons. After a sojourn in Rome, he was chosen to replace the martyred bishop of Lyons, and is himself believed to have been a martyr. Though primarily a pastor and man of faith, he wrote to expound the true faith and to defend it from the attacks of heretics. His two works still extant correspond to those objectives: “The Demonstration of Apostolic Preaching” and five books “Against the Heresies.”

The second-century Church was threatened by Gnosticism, an intellectual elite (“the initiated”) that claimed to possess privileged, secret, knowledge behind the “symbolism” of the faith as it was taught by the Church to the many. Among the errors the “Gnostics” taught was a Manichean dualism that attempted to explain evil; this was accompanied by a pessimism that devalued corporeal realities. But Irenaeus goes far beyond refuting error to establish the internal coherence of the faith…. Truth and salvation are not the privilege of a few, but accessible to all through the preaching of the bishops of the Church, above all, the Bishop of Rome….

The faith must be preached in such a way that it appears outwardly to all, that is, in public as a teaching that is one and spiritual. From these characteristics, one can discern the authentic transmission of the faith in the Church today, as in the time of Irenaeus. More particularly, human dignity—body and soul—is firmly rooted in divine creation, in the image of Christ and in the permanent sanctifying work of the Spirit. This teaching is like a “main road” that makes clear to everyone of good will what are the object and limits of dialogue, and to give an ever new impulse to the strengthening of truth which is the source of all value.

ST. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (150-215)

Clement was born in Athens, where he acquired a keen interest in philosophy that would make him one of the great promoters of dialogue between faith and reason in the Christian tradition. While still a young man he moved to Alexandria, the “symbolic city” of this fruitful nexus between cultures that characterized the Hellenistic age…. During the persecution of 202-203, he took refuge in Caesarea (Cappadocia), where he died. The most important of his works
still extant are “The Exhortation,” “The Instructor,” and “The Stromata” (a Greek word meaning “miscellanies”). These constitute a trilogy on the spiritual maturing of a Christian. In the first, it is the Son of God himself who exhorts the beginner searching for the path of faith on his journey toward truth. Later it is also Christ who instructs him, who teaches the one who is moving toward the deepest truths. These are collected in Clement’s third work, a collection of various arguments from his teaching. Taken together these three works, on the two “wings” of faith and reason, lead to the Truth, who is Christ, the Word of God.... Authentic knowledge (“gnosis,” in Greek) can only be found by coming to know the Person of the Truth. This is the edifice built by reason under the inspiration of a supernatural impulse. Thus authentic “gnosis” is a development of the faith, drawn forth by Christ in the souls of those united to him.

Further on, Clement defines two levels of Christian life. At the first level are believers who live the faith in an ordinary way, although with their horizon always open toward sanctity. At the second level are the proficients, those who aim to lead a life of spiritual perfection...to arrive at knowledge of the Truth and the truths that make up the content of the faith—not simply as a theory, but as lived reality, a life force, union with a transforming love...a love that opens the eyes, transforms the person, and creates communion with the "Logos," the divine Word that is truth and life. In this manner the proficient Christian eventually reaches contemplation of God and union with him.... The objective of life’s journey, a person’s final destiny lies in making himself like God. This is made possible by our con-naturality with him received at the moment of our creation; the person is already an image of God. This con-naturality enables him to know divine realities....Above all, it is by living the faith and practicing the virtues that a person can grow until he reaches the contemplation of God.

On this journey to perfection, Clement gives the same importance to moral requirements as to intellectual ones. The two go together because it is not possible to know the truth without living it, nor to live the truth without knowing it. Rational knowledge is not sufficient in making oneself like God and contemplating him; it is necessary to live according to the “Logos”—that is, according to truth. Thus good works must accompany intellectual knowledge, as a shadow accompanies a body.

Two virtues in particular adorn the soul of a proficient Christian: freedom from passions; possession by love—the true passion—which is accompanied by perfect peace and the ability to make the greatest sacrifices, even the supreme sacrifice. In this way, the ethical ideal of ancient philosophy—freedom from passions—is redefined and complemented by love on the unending journey that leads to being like God.

Clement thus promoted the second great opportunity for dialogue between the Christian message and Greek philosophy. St. Paul, in the Areopagus of Athens, had made the first attempt, for the most part a failed attempt. Now Clement takes up this dialogue again, greatly ennobling it in the tradition of Greek philosophy. He even affirms that God had given philosophy to the Greeks “as their own Testament” (Strom 6,8, 67,1). Almost like the Law for the Jews, it is their context for “revelation.” [The Law for the Hebrews and philosophy for the Greeks] are two currents that lead definitively to the very “Logos.”

Clement can serve as an example for Christians, especially for the catechists of our time. We conclude with an expression from his famous “Prayer to Christ, the ‘Logos’” at the end of his “Instructor”: “Show favor to thy children;...grant that we may live in peace to arrive at thy city...transported with serenity by the Holy Spirit, ineffable Wisdom...to the Son, our Instructor and Teacher” (Instr 3,12,101).

TERTULLIAN (155-230)

Tertullian, a Roman African who received a solid formation in rhetoric, philosophy, law, and history from pagan teachers in Carthage, was converted by the example of the martyrs, and inaugurated Christian culture in the Latin language. His work bore fruits...on many levels:
recovery of classical culture, articulation of a common “Christian soul” in the world, and formulation of new proposals for the moral conduct of social life.

He began publishing the results of his research into the truth in 197. The originality of his thought and its incisive linguistic expression give Tertullian a high place in early Christian literature, even if an excessively rigorous and intemperate character led him to join a sect of Montanism later in life. Most noteworthy are his vigorous defense of the faith and his missionary outreach in communicating it to his contemporaries, emphasizing the rational foundations of the faith, which he presents in a systematic manner.

In his principal work, “Apologeticus,” he lists the main philosophical currents of the time, but his chief contribution is as a witness to the first centuries of the faith when Christians found themselves subjects of a “new culture,” blended of the classical heritage and the Gospel message. By stating that the human soul “is naturally Christian” (Apol 37), he brings out the perennial continuity between Christianity and authentic human values.

ORIGEN OF ALEXANDRIA (185-254)

The few surviving works of his immense output still make Origen the most prolific author of the first three Christian centuries. His interests extended from exegesis to dogma to philosophy to apologetics to asceticism to mysticism—a global vision of Christian life. The core of his work is the “three-pronged reading” of Scriptures… First, the literal, or historical, reading: to know what is actually written and what the text wanted to say intentionally, in itself, in the original languages. In order to compare translations, he prepared a six-column (“Hexapla”) synopsis.

The second reading is analytic, or systematic, and includes the commentaries and explanations he gave his students (in Alexandria and later in Caesarea). Philological and doctrinal notes are appended…. The aim is to understand more fully what the authors wanted to say-reaching now to the moral sense—what we must do to live the Word—not apparent in the “literal” reading…. Then the third reading encompasses the unity of Scripture in its diversity as it seeks to discern the spiritual sense—the meaning of the mysteries, where the souls of the saints are fed in this life and in the next” (Hom Num 9,7)…. Origen reminds us that in the prayerful reading of Scripture and in a coherent way of life, the Church is rejuvenated.

But reading alone, a purely academic treatment, is never sufficient; it is always to be founded on experience, on the experience of prayer, on contact with God. Origen is convinced that the straight path to knowledge of God is love, and that one cannot arrive at an authentic “scientia Christi” without falling in love with him…. It is the same with human relationships: One only really knows the other if there is love, if one opens his heart to the other. He illustrates the significance of the Hebrew verb “to know”: It is love that procures the most authentic knowledge….

This path of perfection, dedication to “lectio divina” and living a pure and virtuous life, “is for everyone,” bringing “the eyes of the heart” to contemplate “the Wisdom and Truth, who is Jesus Christ” (Hom Lk 32:6). This is Origen’s most important lesson for us.

ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA (335-395)

Brother of St. Basil the Great and associate of St. Gregory Nazienzen (collectively known as the Cappadocian Fathers), Gregory was a man of meditative disposition with a great capacity for rhetoric and philosophical reflection [notably in the Platonic tradition], and a lively intellect that was open to the culture of his time. Those qualities combined to make him an original and deep thinker and important figure in early Christian history. He contributed to the victory of orthodoxy over heretical currents by teaching and writing, exercising pastoral leadership and preaching, and persuasively defending the faith....
Gregory’s commentaries on Scripture center on God as Creator, and man as creature, who finds his path to God by studying the reflections of the Creator in himself and his fellowman. In a commentary on the creation of man he shows how God, as “the best artist, forges our nature to make it suitable for the exercise of royal power” (De hom op 4: pg 44, 136b). Debased as we are by sin, we would do well to meditate on Gregory’s praise of man so as to find our way back to that original greatness and achieve our end in the contemplation of God.

The most important lesson Gregory leaves us is that our total fulfillment consists in holiness, in a life lived with God that becomes luminous for others and for the world. The lofty dignity of man results from “stretching ourselves out” to become like God through love, knowledge, and virtuous acts. This expression means that perfection is not achieved once and for all; it is a continuous journey. We are always on the way (Hom in Cant 12: pg44, 1025d), open to ever new horizons and capable of ever greater good. Every initiative comes from God, who “polishes and scrubs our spirit, forming Christ in us” (In Ps 2:11: pg44, 544b). Advancement toward perfection requires that we turn to God in faith-filled prayer (De orat dom 1: pg44 1124a-b)....

Gregory’s teaching remains valid: that we not only speak about God, but also bring Him into us through prayer, and live the spirit of divine-human love. Many of his works are still extant—Scriptural commentaries, homilies, catechetical guides, biographies, short treatises, and letters.

The Fathers of the Church found themselves faced with different philosophies of a Platonic type, in which a complete vision of the world and of life was presented, including the questions of God and religion. In confronting these philosophies, they elaborated a complete vision of reality, starting from the faith and using elements of Platonism, to respond to the essential questions of man. They called this vision, based on biblical revelation and elaborated with a correct Platonism in light of faith, “our philosophy.” The word “philosophy” was not, therefore, the expression of a purely rational system and, as such, different from faith, but it indicated a comprehensive vision of reality, constructed in light of faith, but thought out by reason; a vision that, it is true, went beyond the capacity proper to reason, but as such, was also satisfying for it.

18 – The Legacy of Ancient Philosophy as it has come down to us. Its reception and adaptation by Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thinkers; preview of the synthesis of Christian revelation and Greco-Roman philosophy achieved by medieval thinkers; the European Renaissance.

Review questions for the final exam

*Important note: Do not “look up” and try to memorize “answers” to these questions; think through them and approach them in your own words. Look for the main point: not specific details but the broad overview. According to Jacques Maritain, history’s role in philosophical education is to provide concrete illustrations of the process of trial and error. So let the trials and errors begin!*

1. Are there historical reasons why philosophy originated in the Mediterranean basin at the time it did rather than in the East?

2. What does it indicate about the human mind that the history of philosophy began as a search for the ordering principle of all things?
3. What is most characteristic about philosophy in its first millennium? Focus on unity rather than diversity, continuity rather than disparity.

4. Explain the continuities that occurred in the early history of philosophy; illustrate with an example.

5. How does the study of ancient philosophy help us understand why the pursuit of truth is controversial?

6. How does it make us conscious of the importance of method and its relation to content?

7. How does the study of ancient philosophy illuminate the pursuit of truth about God, the universe (cosmos), nature, change, life, man. What were the principal achievements of the ancients in the following areas of philosophy:
   - philosophy of reason (logic, or analytics)
   - philosophy of God (natural theology, or theodicy)
   - philosophy of being (ontology, or metaphysics)
   - philosophy of knowledge (epistemology, or gnoseology)
   - philosophy of number (mathematics)
   - philosophy of nature (physics, or cosmology)
   - philosophy of beauty (aesthetics)
   - philosophy of body (biology)
   - philosophy of soul (psychology)
   - philosophy of value (ethics)
   - philosophy of community (politics)

8. Explain St. Augustine’s summary of ancient Greek philosophy: “May you seek God, may you find God, may you love God.” In other words, why would the “question” of God be the center of philosophical inquiry?

9. What is a “monist” view of reality; what philosophical schools held it? Likewise, a “pluralist” view of reality? Were any ancient philosophers able to harmonize those two views?

10. How was the question of causation clarified during the first millennium of philosophy? What were some of the principal developments along the way?

11. How was the relation between body and soul dealt with in the ancient period? Why is this question particularly instructive in our attempt to understand the first philosophers?

12. In what way did Academics and Peripatetics constitute the main channels through which philosophy took its most positive steps during the ancient period? What alternatives did they offer in understanding reality?

13. What are the most important works left to us by the ancient philosophers, and what makes them significant today?

14. What is the consensus among later historians and philosophers (especially St. Thomas Aquinas) on the contributions of the ancient Greek and Roman schools and of individual philosophers to the ongoing task of pursuing and clarifying the truth?
15. If one looks at ancient Greek and Roman philosophers from the perspective of divine revelation, how do they help us understand the role of providence in preparing the mind to accept a source of truth above reason?

16. Name some authoritative historians of ancient philosophy.

17. Do all the errors and false starts in the history of philosophy weaken its fruitfulness in trying to reach the most important truths?

### Chronology of Ancient Philosophers

* indicates founders of schools

**Precursors (VIII-VII centuries B.C.):**

1. Hesiod of Boetia (c.775-725)  
   *Theogony; Works and Days*

**Pre-Socratics (VI-V centuries B.C.):**

* 2. Thales of Miletus (c.624-580) – **Ionian School**  
   *The Boundless [one fragment]*

3. Anaximander of Miletus (c.611-547) – Ionian  
   *The Boundless [one fragment]*

4. Anaximenes of Miletus (c.570-502) – Ionian

* 5. Pythagoras of Samos (c.570-500) – **Pythagorean School**

* 6. Xenophanes of Colophon (c.570-478) – **Eleatic School**

7. Heraclitus of Ephesus (c.535-475)  
   *On Nature (πέρι φύσιος) [fragments]*

8. Parmenides of Elea (c.510-445) – Eleatic  
   *On Nature [fragments]*

9. Anaxagoras of Clazomene (c.495-435)

10. Empedocles of Akragas (Agrigentum) (c.484-424)  
    *On Nature; Purifications [fragments]*

11. Zeno of Elea (c.490-415) – Eleatic

12. Melissus of Samos (c.485-410) – Eleatic  
    *On Nature [fragments]*

*13. Protagoras of Abdera (c.481-411) – **Sophistic Movement**  
   *Truth; On the Gods [fragments]*

14. Antiphon of Athens (c.481-411) – Sophist  
   *Orations [fragments]*

*15. Leucippus of Abdera (c.480-410) – **Atomist School**  
   *The Great World Order [fragment]*

16. Diogenes of Apollonia (c.465-415)
On Nature [fragments]

17. Georgias of Leontini (c.483-377) – Sophist
18. Prodicus of Ceos (c.470-404) – Sophist

Contemporaries of Socrates (V-IV centuries B.C.):

*19. SOCRATES OF ATHENS (469-399) – SOCRATIC SCHOOL

20. Democritus of Abdera (c.460-370) – Atomist
   The Lesser World Order; Golden Sayings [fragments]
21. Thucydides of Athens (457-401) – Historian
   The Peloponnesian War
22. Aristophanes of Athens (445-388) – Poet
   The Clouds

*23. Antisthenes of Athens (c.445-365) – Cynic School
*24. Aristippus of Cyrene (c.435-356) – Cyrenaic School
*25. Isocrates of Athens (436-338) – Rhetorical School
   Antidosis; Against the Sophists; The Panegyrc

26. Xenophon of Athens (426-354) – Biographer
   Memorabilia [Recollections of Socrates]

Contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle (IV century B.C.):

*27. PLATO OF ATHENS (428-347) – Academic School
   Dialogues
28. Speucippus of Athens (407-339) – Academic
29. Diogenes of Sinope (c.405-325) – Cynic

*30. ARISTOTLE OF STAGIRA (384-322) – Peripatetic School
   Treatises
31. Theophrastus of Eresus (c.371-287) – Periptetic
   Inquiry into Plants; Characters; Metaphysics; Physical Opinions
32. Xenocrates of Athens (c.339-314) – Old Academic
33. Crates of Thebes (c.365-285) – Old Academic/Cynic

Later Socratics (III-II centuries B.C.):

*34. Pyrrho of Elis (c.365-275) – Sceptic School
*35. Epicurus of Samos/Athens (341-270) – Epicurean School
   Letters; fragments
*36. Zeno of Citium (c.344-262) – Stoic School
   On the Nature of Man [fragments]
37. Arcesilaus of Pitane (315-241) – Middle Academic/Sceptic
38. Cleanthes of Assos (331-232) -- Stoic
   On Pleasure [Hymn to Zeus]
39. Cyrysippus of Cilicia (280-207) – Stoic
Second Century
40. Carneades of Cyrene (213-129) – Middle Academic/Sceptic
41. Panaitius of Rhodes (185-110) – Stoic
42. Antiochus of Ascalon (c.130-68) – New Academic
43. Poseidonius of Apamæa (135-51) – Stoic

First Century B.C.
44. Titus Lucretius Carus of Rome (96-55) – Epicurean
    *De Rerum Natura [On the Nature of Things]*
45. Marcus Tullius Cicero of Rome (106-43) – Eclectic
    *Speeches, Dialogues, Letters*
46. Marcus Terentius Varro of Rome (116-27) – Eclectic
47. Andronicus of Rhodes (c.65-15) – Peripatetic
48. Philo Judaeus of Alexandria (20 B.C.-50 A.D.)
49. Lucius Annaeus Seneca of Cordoba (4 B.C.-65 A.D.) – Stoic
    *Dialogues, Epistles*

First Century A.D.
50. St. Paul of Tarsus (8-67)
    *Epistles*
51. Plutarchus of Chaeronea (c.50-135)
    *Moralia*
52. Epictetus of Hierapolis (55-138) – Stoic
    *Enchiridion: Discourses* (ed. Arrian)
53. St. Justinus, Martyr (100-165) – Academic/Christian
    *Dialogue with Trypho; Apologies*
54. Marcus Aurelius (121-180) – Stoic
    *Meditations*
55. St. Clement of Alexandria (150-215)
    *Exhortation to the Greeks*
56. Tertullian (155-230)
    *Apology*
57. Sextus Empiricus (c. 175-225) – Sceptic
    *Outlines of Pyrrhonism; Adversus Mathematicos*
58. Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 175-225) – Peripatetic
59. Origen of Alexandria (185-254)
    *On First Principles*
60. Diogenes Laertius (c. 200-250)
    *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*
61. Plotinus of Alexandria (204-270) – Neo-Platonic School

*61. Plotinus of Alexandria (204-270) – Neo-Platonic School*
Enneads
62. Porphyry of Tyre (232-305) – Neo-Platonic
   Isagoge; Vita Plotinii
63. Lactantius (240-320)
   Divinae Institutiones

A Good Shelf of Books

1. Francis M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (1912)
3. Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, 3 volumes (1939-1943)
4. Ralph M. McInerny, A History of Western Philosophy, Vol. I: From the Beginnings of Philosophy to Plotinus (1963); also: www.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/hwp
5. Joseph Owens, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy (1959)
12. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, with Constant Reference to Socrates (1841; 1965)
17. Paul Friedländer, Plato, 3 volumes (1958-1969)
23. Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (1961)

Famous verses: Dante, Divina Commedia, Inferno, from Canto IV:
When I had lifted up my brows a little, The Master I beheld of those who know, Sit with his philosophic family. All gaze upon him, and all do him honor. There I beheld both Socrates and Plato. Who nearer him before the others stand; Democritus, who puts the world on chance, Diogenes, Anaxagoras, and Thales, Zeno, Empedocles, and Heraclitus; Of qualities I saw the good collector, Dioscorides; and Orpheus, Tully, Livy, and moral Seneca….

A Cautionary Postscript from St. Paul

Βλέπετε μή τις ημᾶς ἔσται ὁ συλαγωγὸν διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ κενῆς απάτης κατὰ τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν ανθρώπων, κατὰ τά στοιχεία τοῦ κόσμου καί οὐ κατὰ Χριστόν.
Videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam secundum traditionem hominum, secundum elementa mundi, et non secundum Christum.  

*Ad Colossenses 2:8*

See that you not be deceived by philosophy and erroneous vanities according to human tradition, according to the elements of the world, and not according to Christ.  *Colos. 2:8*
This course presents the chief thinkers and the doctrines they taught—mainly under Christian inspiration—between the close of antiquity in the period of the Church Fathers (II century) and the early Renaissance (XV century). Attention is also given to general intellectual development in the cultural, religious, social and political contexts of Eastern and Western Europe and adjacent areas of the Middle East and North Africa during that long period of history.

Of the contributions the Middle Ages made to the history of philosophy, only the most significant ones, such as the close relation between philosophy and theology, can be treated in this brief introduction. Problems of interest to specialists must be passed over, along with the minor thinkers, in order to concentrate on achievements that made the greatest impact on later philosophers and schools—primarily those of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas.

A SUMMARY OF THE COURSE
(paraphrase of John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, 36-46)

A. Early Encounters between Faith and Reason

36. The Fathers of the Church drew upon the Greek philosophers whose search for a rational foundation for belief in the Divinity had brought to light the link between reason and religion.

37. The early Christian thinkers were careful to distinguish authentic philosophy from gnostic speculations reserved for a select few.

38. St. Justin and St. Clement of Alexandria pioneered this cautious discernment so as to defend and deepen faith in Christ and lead men and women to conversion of heart.

39. Origen adopted Platonic arguments to counter attacks and construct an early form of Christian theology in a set of reflections which express true doctrine about God.

40. The Christianizing of neo-Platonic thought was led by the Cappadocian Fathers, Pseudo Dionysius, and especially St. Augustine, who
produced the first great synthesis of philosophy and theology; it sustained the Church for ten centuries.

41. In confronting the relationship between faith and reason, Eastern and Western Fathers showed the same critical consciousness by recognizing points of convergence and of divergence, thus disclosing what had been only implicit in ancient thought: that the supreme Good and ultimate Truth in the Word made flesh may be attained when reason is enlightened by faith.

42. In Scholastic theology, pioneered by St. Anselm and St. Albert, philosophically trained reason confirms the fundamental harmony between the knowledge of revealed truths and the knowledge of natural truths; a corresponding growth of love is fired by the intellect’s progress toward the one truth of all things, as St. Bonaventure showed.

B. The Enduring Originality of St. Thomas Aquinas

43. Recovering the treasures in the philosophy of Aristotle and engaging his leading Arab and Jewish commentators in fruitful dialogue, the Common Doctor traced out a new path for philosophy and worked out the model for the right way to do theology in the schools as the harmonious constructing and perfecting of reason on the foundation of faith.

44. St. Thomas showed how to bring to the maturity of wisdom the complementary philosophical intellect and theological revelation in a realist teaching of “what is,” which recognizes the objectivity of truth and arrives at a right judgment concerning the divine realities proposed by faith.

C. The Drama of the Separation of Faith and Reason

45. This recognition of the organic link that joins the distinct disciplines of theology and philosophy gave way to a growing suspicion, separation, and eventually division into an exaggerated rationalism independent of faith (Averroism) and an exaggerated fideism distrustful of reason (mysticism; nominalism).

46. Strong currents opposed to Christian revelation and philosophical realism subsequently arose out of these radical positions: idealism, secular humanism, positivism, and eventually nihilism, which rejects the possibility of attaining truth and forming commitments, offering instead immediate sensual gratification and the ephemeral experiences so attractive to many of our contemporaries.
Course Outline

CLASS 1
1 – Introduction to medieval philosophy; its significance in the history of philosophy; emergence of Christian philosophy; the Middle Ages as historical and cultural concept; overview of the course and source materials; procedure to be followed.

PART I: THE AGE OF THE FATHERS (Second to Seventh Centuries)

CLASS 2
2 – The Fathers as philosophers; their intellectual environment and programs of formation; the impact of Greek education and philosophy on the early Christians; neoplatonic and gnostic influences; the increasing significance of Roman influences.

CLASS 3, 4
3 – The intellectual orientation of the early Greek and Latin Fathers; St. Justin Martyr; the schools of Alexandria (St. Clement, Origen), Cappadocia (St. Gregory of Nyssa), and Antioch; the intellectual biography and chief philosophical works of St. Augustine.

CLASS 5, 6, 7, 8
4 – The Augustinian synthesis of classical and Christian wisdom; its principal themes and doctrines; the later Greek and Latin Fathers and the founding of the Middle Ages; Pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite; Boethius, Cassiodorus, Isidoro of Seville; the closing of the Academy of Athens by Justinian (“the Jurist”) in 529; trivium and quadrivium in the monastic schools.

PART II: TRANSITION TO SCHOLASTICISM (Eighth to Twelfth Centuries)

CLASS 9
5 – Christian antecedents: the Carolingian renaissance; Charlemagne’s schools: Alcuin and John Scotus Eriugena; the rise of cathedral schools; the school of Chartres and its major themes (logic and dialectic; the problem of universals); St. Peter Damian; Abelard; St. Anselm; the Augustinian canons (Hugh and Richard of St. Victor); St. Bernard; Peter Lombard; the attempt to make philosophy more “scientific.”

CLASS 10
6 – Arabic antecedents: the recovery and teaching of Aristotle’s system in the Islamic and Jewish schools; Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Algazali; Averroës (“the Commentator”); Moses Maimonides (“the Rabbi”); the convergence of Augustinian and Aristotelian influences in the new universities.
PART III: THE AGE OF THE SCHOOLMEN (Thirteenth Century)

CLASS 11
7 – The intellectual environment of the Scholastic philosophers; the influence of the mendicant orders in the maturing of Scholasticism; the translation of Aristotle (“the Philosopher”) into Latin; the universities of Paris and Oxford (masters, bishops, kings); channeling the new mood of reform.

CLASS 12
8 – The primacy of concrete particulars in the Aristotelian empiricism of St. Albert the Great (Dominican); philosophy in the service of divine love in the Augustinian idealism of St. Bonaventure (Franciscan).

CLASS 13, 14, 15, 16
9 – The genius and achievement of St. Thomas Aquinas; his formation and intellectual biography; the body of his scholarship; the historical importance and perennial significance of his harmonious synthesis of classical and Christian wisdom, of reason and faith; philosophy as science and as way of life.

CLASS 17, 18
10 – Philosophy in the service of theology; the methodology and system of Thomism: God, man, the world.

PART IV: DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM (Fourteenth to Sixteenth Centuries)

CLASS 19
11 – The reaction to “Latin Averroism” and the Condemnation of 1277; the first challenges to Thomism and ensuing controversies; Bl. John Duns Scotus and the voluntarist alternative; the need to reconcile philosophical speculations with the freedom of God.

CLASS 20
12 – The fracturing of the schools over the limits of philosophy; the impact of the scientific movement in logic and physics; the reaction of “speculative mysticism”: Meister Eckhart; the reaction of skeptical “nominalism”: William of Ockham; the separation of reason from faith (antecedents of fideism and rationalism).
CLASS 21

13 – **Moving beyond** the Middle Ages: the clash of papal and imperial aims; the merger of Scholasticism with a new **humanism** in the early Renaissance; efforts to preserve the achievements of medieval philosophy: the poetic philosophy of **Dante**; exploration and the discovery of a “new world”; the Protestant revolt; the traditional humanism of More and Erasmus; the systematic treatises of Vitoria and Suarez.

CLASS 22, 23, 24, 25

14 – A summing up of **medieval philosophy**: 1 – reasoning in faith (philosophy and theology); 2 – divine illumination; 3 – universals; 4 – theories of causality; the **legacy** of medieval philosophy: its reception in the Modern Age; preparation for the examination.

**READINGS AND REFERENCES**

Students should examine more closely the material in boldface. In addition to these books, relevant materials are also available via the internet (especially [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/) -- the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

For Part I:

   
   **Maps 528, 737, 1028, 1212, 1478.**
2. Charles Norris Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (1940)
   
   **Preface**
   
   **III, IV (pp. 26-46)**
4. Josef Pieper, *Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy* (1960); **I, II (pp. 15-44)**
5. T.B.F., comp., *St. Augustine: Essays on His Age, Life, and Thought* (1930)
   
   V. (M. C. D’Arcy, SJ, “The Philosophy of St. Augustine”)
   
   **1. (“The Genius of St. Augustine”)**
   
   **II-VI (Choose one excerpt)**
For Part II:
1. Pieper (1960)  
   III-VII (pp. 44-108)  
2. Frederick Copleston, SJ, A History of Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus (1950)  
3. Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy (1972)  
   Introduction (pp. 7-24)  
7. Arthur Hyman and James Walsh, eds. Philosophy in the Middle Ages (1983)  
   (Choose one excerpt.)  
   (Choose one excerpt.)

For Part III:
1. Pieper (1960)  
   XII (pp. 151-162)  
2. Copleston (1950)  
5. Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (1940)  
   XX ("The Middle Ages and Philosophy")  
6. Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (1938)  
   III ("The Harmony of Reason and Revelation")  
7. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (1955)  
   Introduction  
9. Gilson, The Spirit of Thomism (1964)  
10. Jacques Maritain, St. Thomas Aquinas (1931)  
13. G.K. Chesterton, St. Thomas Aquinas, ‘The Dumb Ox’ (1933)  
   (Select one article.)
For Part IV:
1. Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Ockham to Suarez (1953)
2. Maritain (1931)
   Appendix III (first three Papal documents—pp. 179-244)
   38-45

**CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHERS**

Precursors (150-650):
1. St. Justin Martyr (105-165)  
   *Second Century*  
   *Hortatory Address to the Greeks; Dialogue with Trypho the Jew*
2. St. Clement of Alexandria (150-213)  
   *Third Century*  
   *Exhortation to the Greeks; The Stromata (Miscellanies)*
3. Origen (185-254)  
   *Fourth Century*  
   *On the Principles, or Foundations (De Principiis)*
4. St. Gregory of Nyssa (335-395)  
   *Fifth Century*  
   *Hexameron: On the Creation of Man; Dialogue with Macrina on the Soul*
5. **ST. AUGUSTINE** (354-430)  
   *Sixth Century*  
   *The Teacher; Free Choice of the Will, and other early dialogues;*  
   *Soliloquies; Confessions; The City of God*
6. Pseudo Dionysius (475-525)  
   *Seventh Century*  
   *On the Divine Names; On Celestial Hierarchies*
7. Boethius (480-525)  
   *The Consolation of Philosophy; How Substances Can Be Good*
8. Cassiodorus (480-565)  
   *Eighth Century*  
   *On Learning (De Institutione); On the Soul*
   *Ninth Century*  
   *The Etymologies, or Origins; The Nature of Things*

Founders (800-1200):
10. Alcuin (730-804)  
    *Tenth Century*  
    *On the Division of Nature*
11. John Scotus Eriugena (810-877)  
    *Eleventh Century*  
    *On the Intellect and the Intelligible; Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*
12. Alfarabi (870-950)  
    *Metaphysics: The Healing; Psychology; The Deliverance*
13. Avicenna [Ibn Sina] (980-1037)  
    *Metaphysics: The Healing; Psychology; The Deliverance*
   
   On Divine Omnipotence

15. ST. ANSELM, Archbishop (1033-1109)
   
   Monologium; Prosligion: subsequent Replies (to Gaunilon)

16. Algazali (1058-1111)
   
   Deliverance from Error; The Incoherence of the Philosophers

17. Peter Abailard (1079-1142)
   
   Twelfth Century
   
   Glosses on Porphyry; Ethics, Or Know Thyself

18. St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153)
   
   On Grace and Free Will

19. Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1141)
   
   Didascalion, Or The Art of Reading

20. Peter Lombard, Archbishop (1100-1160)

   The Sentences (Positions)

   
   On the Trinity; On the Grace of Contemplation

22. John of Salisbury (1115-1180)
   
   The Metalogicon; The Polycraticus (Statesman)

23. AVERROËS [Ibn Rushd] (1126-1198)

   The Decisive Treatise; The Celestial Sphere; On the De Anima

24. Moses Maimonides (1135-1204)

   The Guide for the Perplexed

Masters (1200-1300):

25. Alexander of Hales OSF (1185-1245)

   Thirteenth Century
   
   Glosses on Peter Lombard’s Sentences

26. Robert Grosseteste, Bishop (1175-1253)

   On Light; On Lines, Angles, and Figures

27. ST. ALBERT THE GREAT OP, Bishop (1206-1280)

   Summa of Creatures; Summa of Theology

28. Roger Bacon OSF (1214-1292)

   Opus Maius (Longer Work); Opus Minus; Opus Tertium

29. ST. BONAVENTURE OSF, Cardinal (1221-1274)

   On the Hexameron; Retracing the Arts to Theology

30. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS OP (1225-1274)

   Disputed Questions; Summa Theologiae; On Being and Essence
31. Siger of Brabant (1240-1284)
   *On the Eternity of the World; On the Intellective Soul*

32. Boetius of Dacia OP (1250-1300)
   *On the Supreme Good, or On the Life of the Philosopher*

33. Giles of Rome, Archbishop (1247-1316)
   *Theorems on Existence and Essence*

34. **BL. JOHN DUNS SCOTUS** OSF (1265-1308)
   *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard; The Questions*

35. Meister Eckhart OP (1260-1327)
   *Questions on Being*

36. **DANTE ALIGHIERI** (1265-1321)
   *Convivio (The Banquet); The Divine Comedy*

Successors: (1300-1550)

37. Marsilius of Padua (1280-1343)
   *The Defender of Peace*

38. **WILLIAM OF OCKHAM** OSF (1298-1349)
   *Complete Summa of Logic; Commentaries on the Sentences*

39. John Buridan (1295-1358)
   *Questions on the Metaphysics; on the Nicomachean Ethics*

40. John Gerson (1363-1429)
   *Propositions on the Modes of Signification; The Concordance*

41. Nicholas of Cusa, Cardinal (1401-1464)
   *On Learned Ignorance*

42. Marsiglio Ficino (1433-1499)
   *The Platonic Theology on the Immortality of the Soul*

43. Thomas de Vio OP, Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534)
   *Commentaries on the Summa Theologicae and On Being and Essence*

44. Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536)
   *The Praise of Folly; Colloquies (On Free Will; On Faith)*

45. **ST. THOMAS MORE** (1478-1535)
   *Utopia; The Dialogue of Comfort in Tribulation; The Apology*

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**SOME EXAMINATION QUESTIONS**

Fides quaerens intellectum omnia explicat.

1. Choose five of the philosophers we studied and write a brief evaluation of the way they conducted their courses, as if you had been one of their students.
Include not only what you learned from them, but the effectiveness of their teaching style.

2. What accounts for the pre-eminence of St. Thomas Aquinas among the philosophers of the Middle Ages? Why is he called “the Common Doctor”?

3. Comment on the general perception that the history of medieval philosophy contains an ongoing and unresolved tension between the neo-Platonic/Augustinian tradition and the neo-Aristotelian/Scholastic tradition. Do you see this as an advantage or a liability for the progress and development of philosophy?

4. Is Christian philosophy, as it was worked out in the Middle Ages, the only adequate and valid way to philosophize? Why, or why not?

5. Viewing the medieval period within the larger context of the history of philosophy, would you say that the controversies and rivalries that frequently agitated intellectual life in the Middle Ages did more to advance or to retard philosophical development?

6. It has been maintained that a morally upright life is closely related to the way philosophy is practiced (i.e. that there is a close correlation between truth and goodness). Is there evidence of this factor in the division that began during the Middle Ages between thinkers who try to harmonize reason and faith and those who try to separate them? Or is that a purely intellectual issue?

MORE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FROM THE 2002 EXAMS

1. What knowledge that we gained in the previous history course (Greek and Roman antiquity) was principally relevant for our studies in this second course? In particular, why did it take Aristotle’s influence so much longer than Plato’s to penetrate the subsequent history of philosophy?

2. If our main concentration in this course was on St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, why did we give so much attention to other schools and thinkers? Why do we need to know, for example, what were the main centers of philosophical life not only in the V and XIII centuries, but also in the VIII, X, and XV?

3. With respect to Aquinas, what mainly accounts for his achievement? Why did it take so long for his contributions to become widely recognized in the history of philosophy? How did St. Thomas teach? What did he expect of his students?
4. With respect to Augustine, why was he an “instant hit” and become established as the foremost philosophical authority for a thousand years? What impact did this have on St. Thomas’ formation?

5. What is Scholasticism and how did it arise in the history of philosophy? Explain the Scholastic method of inquiry. Is it the same as Thomism? Is it the same as philosophical realism? Why do our institutional studies depend so heavily on Thomism?

6. If the modern Popes and so many leading philosophers of the XX century found in Thomism the greatest achievement of the philosophical mind, why did its influence begin to decline even during the lifetime of St. Thomas and take so long to reappear in the universities?

7. How did the connection between faith and reason develop during the Middle Ages? What brought them together? What caused their separation? What happened to philosophy when they worked closely together, and when they separated?

8. Besides Augustine and Aquinas, we recognized the eminence of six other major philosophers. What mainly characterizes the contributions of Anselm, Albert, Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, and Dante? Why do historians also give importance to Averroës and Ockham?

9. Who were these men, when were they active, and what is their significance for medieval philosophy?—Origen, Isidoro of Seville, Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius, Alcuin, William of Moerbeke.

10. Why were so many of the medieval philosophers “controversial”?—most notably Peter Abailard, Siger of Brabant, William of Ockham, Meister Eckhard, Averroës. Did the controversies and rivalries that developed during the Middle Ages advance or retard the development of philosophy?

11. How is the quest for truth related to love for the good in medieval philosophy? What were the specific contributions of Augustine, Bonaventure, and Dante in understanding that relationship?

12. When and why did logic replace metaphysics as the main concern of philosophers? What were the consequences? How did nominalism arise from this development?

13. Explain the significance of the problem of universals in the history of philosophy? The problem of illumination?
14. Did these learned men become saints because of their work in philosophy or in spite of it?—Justin, Augustine, Anselm, Albert, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Duns Scotus. Can we derive any lessons from this?

15. Did the following saintly men fail to be canonized because of their work in philosophy or in spite of it?—Origen, Boethius, Dante. Can we derive any lessons from this?

16. What, finally, is the main lesson philosophy learned from the men of the Middle Ages? Why is it sometimes maintained that the Middle Ages have not yet ended?
This course deals with modern philosophy from its beginnings in the fifteenth century to the early nineteenth century.

As an introduction, it describes the most characteristic features of modern philosophy and culture (including the twentieth century), which in a general way struck a humanistic chord composed of several related elements. These included a close consideration of man as the centerpiece of the world and along with it insisted upon the independence of man and of science from ecclesiastical influence, broad expressions of freedom and of human rights in political life, and the supreme value of human reason. Another element gave a disproportionate value to the centrality of man; this led to an immanentist anthropocentrism and insistence upon an absolute autonomy which led to a series of ruptures between man and God, reason and faith, nature and grace, freedom and authority. These were to have harmful consequences in subsequent history.

After this introduction, the course takes up the cultural impact of humanism and the thought of Renaissance figures, such as Nicholas of Cusa, who consciously inserted an anthropological emphasis into traditional theology.

Turning to sixteenth-century thought, the course analyzes the flourishing of scholastic philosophy alongside the beginnings of a crisis of skepticism in metaphysics and ethics; this was to continue into the seventeenth century in the form of boundless intellectual liberty.

The modern scientific revolution is also considered, as the primary cause of a crisis in the traditional philosophy of nature and of knowledge, which opened the way into the typical themes of modern thought. DESCARTES tried to introduce a novel philosophy by employing a method of absolute certitude in order to provide a firm foundation for the sciences and to overcome skepticism. This rationalist philosophy was further developed by Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and criticized by authors such as Pascal and Vico. The philosophical empiricism of BACON, HOBBES, LOCKE, BERKELEY, and HUME proposed the senses as the principal subject for critical analysis, an anti-metaphysical orientation that led to devastating consequences for man, both in ethics and in politics.

In the eighteenth century, the main topic is the Enlightenment, which presented in a particularly vivid way the radical autonomy of reason and a corresponding critique of traditional religion. The critical philosophy of KANT deserves special attention, for it represents an original synthesis of the intellectual ideals of the enlightened man along with an attempt to provide a new grounding for philosophy, science, ethics, and freedom.
The best-known representatives of what was called romantic philosophy—a criticism of the Enlightenment—were the idealist thinkers, Fichte, Schelling, and HEGEL. Although they sought to overcome divisions caused by the insistence on absolute autonomy, these thinkers were unable to avoid absolutizing the person and reason. Thus Hegelian philosophy opened the way for historicism.

PROLOGUE: John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*, 45-46

*C. The Drama of the Separation of Faith and Reason*

45. When the first universities brought theology into a more intimate contact with other branches of learning, St. Albert and St. Thomas recognized both the organic link and the legitimate distinction between theology and the secular disciplines as autonomous but mutually reinforcing fields of research; in the later Middle Ages, however, an increasing separation between them led to a division into exaggerated rationalism independent of faith and meant to replace it altogether, and an exaggerated fideism which mistrusted reason even to the point of denying rationality.

46. In the subsequent development of Western philosophy, strong currents opposed to Christian Revelation arose from these radical positions and reached their apogee in the nineteenth century: *idealism* transformed the contents of faith into dialectical structures fully accessible to reason; *atheistic humanism* replaced faith, which it regarded as alienating to the human spirit, with new socio-political religions and the disastrous totalitarian experiments they engendered; *positivism*, beguiled by technological progress, succumbed to the temptation of a quasi-divine power over nature and man, rejecting at the same time metaphysical and moral criteria; *nihilism*, seeing everything as fleeting and provisional, rejected the possibility of attaining permanent truths and forming lasting commitments, and offered in their place immediate sensual gratification and ephemeral experiences which still attract many of our contemporaries.

INTRODUCTION

class 1 (June 6)

*reading*: Walsh (1990), pp. 1-5.

PART I: FAITH AND REASON

*reading*: Casarella (1999); McInerny (1998); Cessario (1999); Di Noia (1999); Young (1999), pp. 6-19.

class 2 (June 7)

class 3 (June 8)

PART II: ANALYSIS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY
class 4 (June 9)
reading: de Torre (1997); Gilson-Langan (1963); pp. 55-61, 72-85.

PART III: CRITICISM OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY
class 5 (June 11)
reading: Congdon (1986), Barrett (1986); pp. 86-103.

class 6 (June 12)

PART IV: REFLECTIONS ON MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE
class 7 (June 14)
reading: Chesterton (1910), Berdyaev (1935); pp. 114-132.

class 8 (June 15)

class 9 (June 16)

CONCLUSION
class 10 (June 18)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adler, Mortimer Ten Philosophical Mistakes: Basic Errors in Modern Thought
New York: Macmillan, 1985

Barrett, William Death of the Soul: From Descartes to the Computer
New York: Doubleday, 1986

Berdyaev, Nikolai The Fate of Man in the Modern World
Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 1961 (1935)

Chesterton, G. K. What’s Wrong with the World
New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956 (1910)

Congdon, Lee “Unscientific Postscript,” The World and I (July, 1986), 458-463
Some preliminary questions: Why do so many young people turn away from Christianity and refuse to let it influence their lives? What makes them constantly and restlessly pursue what is new or newer, and to discard what is old or older? Why is there such an extreme consciousness of a need for liberation, or emancipation by so many discontented elements of our society? Is impatience a necessary consequence of progress and discovery in the natural sciences? Can we discover why modern intellectuals think of human well being in terms of imperfect and perfect structures, or patterns of organization?

Some answers given by Jacques Maritain in two lectures at the University of Notre Dame, October 8 and 10, 1956:
I. The fear of death, as the most terrible of things, as the most irrational, mysterious, and destabilizing of experiences.

A longing for immortality, as perverted by atheistic assumptions: that one should seek refuge in a world spirit capable of conferring immortality within history through a constantly developing dialectic.

Human reason can achieve total victory when nothing irrational remains to oppose it. (Hegel was the greatest irrationalist in the history of philosophy, and at the same time the most “rational.”)

II. Misunderstanding or misinterpreting freedom (something to be conquered and overcome).

Singularity, personhood, and freedom are expelled from the individual and placed within a greater whole. They become real only beyond the individual--in a structure devised by the mind (the State).

III. Freedom as the realization that my interests are represented by and contained with the interests of the State—the highest and most complete freedom as unification with and submergence in the State, as escape from my own particularity.

The State as supreme objectification (externalization) of the Spirit; nothing can be superior to it. It is divine (self-subsisting). There is nothing holier than the Law of the State. Only the State saves.

IV. The roots of this idea are in Hobbes and Rousseau, but only Hegelian philosophy is religious from its very foundation (an immanent religion, which eliminates transcendent religion). It kills true religion because the spiritual is captured by the temporal (“bad divinization”).

Theology is taken over by philosophy; the State absorbs the Church. The most imponderable matters are brought within the control of the Legislator’s mind. It creates its own savior. Man attains perfect freedom by becoming divine, the Emperor of the world, of history.

AFTERWORD

Idealism is the logic of modern intellectuals:
(1) The world as it is has radical defects and is therefore totally unacceptable (the total critique);
(2) I can see in my mind a paradise, utopia, the perfect way to organize the world.
(3) In order to replace the actual world, all that is necessary is to find a way to implement my idea of a perfect world order.

This kind of thinking is rooted in a jealousy and hatred of God. The Creator is blamed for a bad job of it, and the intellectual imagines himself as a new and better creator. The Self is equipped with superhuman powers of insight.
Idealism collapses the distinction between actual being (in fact) and logical being (in reason); what is real is rational. Logic absorbs metaphysics; being becomes nothing.

Contrast this with philosophical realism:

1. The world as it is has many defects, along with its good features, but there are good reasons for them and one must strive to work within the limitations.
2. One can surely imagine many ways of improving things.
3. It is good to try to improve the world, so long as one doesn’t imagine that it is possible to eliminate all its imperfections.

The realist tries to understand what the Creator has done and what He has permitted us to do.

For the modern intellectuals, philosophy is conceived of as a system that is intended to create structures (effective machinery of policy and power). They see it as task-oriented; something is to be done (constructed). Example: Comte’s system of positive philosophy; its application (pragmatism) by his disciples (James, Dewey).

For the classical realists, philosophy is inquiry; instead of making statements, it asks questions (something is to be understood). Structures are necessary, but they are seen as provisional, experimental, temporary expedients.
PROLOGUE

Pope John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*, 47-48

47. Recent cultural shifts have tended to marginalize philosophy and reduce it from universal wisdom and learning in quest of life’s meaning and ultimate goal in the contemplation of truth, to one among many fields of knowing directed by subjective and utilitarian motives to the pursuit of pleasure or power. Twenty years ago (in *Redemptor Hominis*) the drama of present-day human existence was shown to contain a danger that the very works of human genius—of intellect and will—would turn against man and burden him with fear of new forms of servitude.

48. While the recent history of philosophy reveals a growing separation between faith and reason, on closer scrutiny we also find in it seminal insights which can lead to the discovery of truth if pursued by a rightly tuned mind and heart—for example, analyses of personhood, freedom, time, perception and experience, especially the experience of death. When faith and reason are deprived of each other they take futile side-tracks: reason misses the newness and radicality of being; faith risks withering into myth and superstition....

Introduction. (class 1)

This final segment of the history of philosophy attempts to present in 20 classes an understanding and evaluation of the principal philosophical currents which arose around the beginning of the 19th century in the aftermath of idealism and continued to develop throughout the 20th. Inevitably, the course will be selective in its focus upon thinkers and ideas judged to be most significant for us in the West today. Within the broad outline of the historical record (what has been thought, and by whom), emphasis will be placed on explaining those elements which have contributed the most to true understanding and which therefore have the most promise for the new millennium.

The recent history of philosophy has been characterized by extreme diversity among hypotheses, positions, and reactions and by the proliferation of ideologies. Particular emphasis has been placed on logic and linguistics, anthropological questions, and the search for new methods of philosophical analysis. Toward the end of the 20th century these developments culminated in
“post-modernism,” a sharp critical and culturally evolutionary reaction to most of the principles previously defended by philosophers. This atmosphere of doubt and denial has had the effect of permitting a strong reaffirmation of the proper sphere of rational inquiry—most recently by Pope John Paul II in *Fides et Ratio*.

On balance, this culminating study of the history of philosophy affords a clear overview of the 2,500-year career of man’s conscious search for the whole truth about the world and his place within it and above it. The ancient tradition of a realistic philosophy which accepts the evidence of perceptible reality and is open to transcendent knowledge, human spirituality, and the higher plane of Christian revelation, can now be seen in its full significance within the whole panoply of philosophical currents and methods.

**Schematic Outline**

1. **CONTEXT.** (class 2)

   Review of the system of **HEGEL**. Derivatives and critiques of idealistic systems, principally Hegelianism. Decline of rationalism. Fragmentation of philosophical thought. The continuing significance of Kant in recent philosophy.

2. **DERIVATIVES OF IDEALISM: The “Right” Hegelians.** (class 3)

   a) **SCHOPENHAUER; Bradley**: Subjective idealism in metaphysics and ethics. The movement from reason to will; from optimism to pessimism. Pain and asceticism.

   b) **KIERKEGAARD; Royce**: Critique of systematic abstraction. Existence and subjectivity. Fundamental existential categories (anguish, decision, freedom). The stages of man’s existence. Faith and reason.

3. **CRITIQUES OF IDEALISM: The “Left” Hegelians.** (class 4)

   a) **Feuerbach**: Reduction of Hegelian theology to materialist anthropology. Philosophical atheism.

   b) **MARX**: Dialectical materialism. Marxist sociologism and theory of history. Alienation. Division of labor and history as class struggle. The mission of capitalism. The concept of revolution and of revolutionary consciousness. From socialism to “classless society.” Subsequent decomposition and reappearances of Marxist thought.
4. SCIENTIFIC POSITIVISM AND EMPIRICISM. (class 5)

   a) **COMTE; Renan; Durkheim; Moore**: Scientific positivism. Comtean sociology. Science as the theology and philosophy of humanity. Philosophical skepticism. Empiricist ethics and relativism.

   b) **DARWIN; SPENCER; Taine; Teilhard de Chardin**: Naturalistic scientism. Evolutionism and scientific reductionism. Philosophical aspects of evolutionist anthropology.

   c) **Dilthey; Poincaré; Duhem**: Positivist philosophy of history. Physical positivism; empiricist philosophy of science.

5. VITALISM. (class 6)


   b) **FREUD**: Metapsychological view of man based on a materialist anthropology. The unconscious and repression. Psychoanalysis.

6. FROM UTILITARIANISM TO PRAGMATISM. (class 7)

   a) **MILL; Schiller**: The patrimony of Bentham. The utilitarian ethic. Its link to subjective individualism. The development of modern liberal humanism.

   b) **Peirce; JAMES; DEWEY**: Flight from metaphysics as the basis of anthropology, psychology, and ethics. The pragmatic school and its progeny. The impact of Dewey’s instrumentalism on American culture.

7. NEO-POSITIVIST ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY. (class 8)

   a) **Frege; Whitehead; RUSSELL**: Mathematics as a philosophical tool. The quest for a new methodology in logical idealism. The return to rationalism.

   b) **Saussure**: The discovery of philosophical linguistics. The development of structuralism.

8. PHENOMENOLOGY. (classes 9, 10)

   a) **Husserl; Scheler**: Critique of psychologism and relativism. Ontological reduction and transcendental intuition.
+ b) Stein; Hartmann: Intuition of values. The need for being. The strata of being. The persistence of philosophical realism.

c) Heidegger: The critique of metaphysics in ontological phenomenology. Inauthentic and authentic existence. Time as a sense of being. Non-being.

d) Merleau-Ponty: Neo-Marxism in phenomenology.

9. FORMS OF EXISTENTIALISM. (classes 11, 12)

a) Nietzsche: The Nietzschean revolution in moral philosophy. The transvaluation of all values in the absence of a supreme Being. The “higher man” and his will to power. Nihilism as creative.

b) Ortega y Gasset; Jaspers; Buber: Existence as a philosophical theme. Existential pessimism. The attempt at a scientific existentialism.


d) Camus; Sartre: Nihilistic pessimism. The ambiguous and futile quest for closure.

10. NEO-SPIRITUALISM AND PERSONALISM. (classes 13, 14)

+ a) Blondel: Right action as the end of philosophy.

+ b) LeSenne; Mounier: Existential antecedents of personalism. Moral choices in the presence of the other.

+ c) Von Hildebrand; Wojtyła: Phenomenological antecedents of personalism. The person as the end of action.

11. NEO-SCHOLASTICISM AND THOMISM. (class 15, 16)


+ b) Maritain; Simon; Gilson: Thomistic applications to metaphysics and epistemology, ethics and politics.
c) Fabro; Wilhelmsen; Pieper: Applications of Thomism to the full range of modern life.

12. LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND POSTMODERNISM. (classes 17)

a) The Vienna Circle—WITTGENSTEIN; Ayer; Popper; Ryle: Anti-metaphysical reduction of method to logical analysis. The effort to discover a truly scientific epistemology. Linguistic analysis.

b) The Frankfurt School—Adorno; Horkheimer; Habermas: Derivation of social scientific methodology from Marxist categories.


d) Methodology—Gadamer; Quine; Lyotard; Rorty: Hermeneutics. Neo-Pragmatism. The return to nominalism. The appeal for consensus.

e) Neo-Structuralism—Levi-Strauss; Foucault; Derridá: Replacement of reasoning with artificial constructs. “Deconstructionism.”

13. NEO-CLASSICAL REVIVAL. (classes 18, 19)

+ Arendt; Voegelin; Anscombe; MacIntyre: Rediscovery of classical categories of metaphysics, psychology, and ethics in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

Conclusion. (class 20)

Overall, the development of academic philosophy in the 20th century has culminated in a crisis of identity and generally futile attempts to define its proper role. In moral and political philosophy the opposing influences of Christian personalism and defense of human rights, on the one hand, and the forces of multiculturalism, relativism, and radical toleration, on the other hand, have led to widespread confusion in contemporary attempts to realize the ideal of democracy. An overview of the most influential philosophical tendencies of the past two centuries demonstrates the critical importance of attempting to recover the confident realism of classical and Christian philosophy.

Bibliography


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**Chronological List of 75 Recent Philosophers (1800-2000) HEGEL to WOJTYŁA**

1 *HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich* (1770-1831) – *Phenomenology of the Spirit* (1807); *The Science of Logic* (1812-16); *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817); *Philosophy of Right* (1821)
German [Berlin]; Idealism

2 *SCHOPENHAUER, Artur* (1788-1860) – *The World as Will and Idea* (1819; 1906); *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1813; 1888)
German [Frankfurt]; Subjective idealism; philosophical pessimism

3 *COMTE, Auguste* (1798-1857) – *Positive Philosophy* (1830-42; 1853); *Positive Politics* (1851-54; 1875-77)
French [Paris]; Sociological positivism (founder)
4 FEUERBACH, Ludwig (1804-1872) – *On Philosophy and Christianity* (1839); *The Essence of Christianity* (1841); *The Essence of Religion* (1845)
German; Left-Hegelian atheistic humanism

5 *KIERKEGAARD, Soren* (1813-1855) – *Either/Or* (1843); *Philosophical Fragments* (1844; 1936); *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1846; 1941);
Danish [Copenhagen]; Nonsystematic subjectivism

6 *MARX, Karl* (1818-1883) – *Manuscripts of 1844* (1844); *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845); *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847)
German [Paris; London]; Dialectical and historical materialism (founder)

7 *MILL, John Stuart* (1806-1873) – *Utilitarianism* (1861); *System of Logic* (1843); *Auguste Comte and Positivism* (1865); *Dissertations and Discussions* (1859-75); *On Liberty* (1859)
British [London]; Utilitarianism; individualism

8 ROSMINI-SERBATI, Antonio (1797-1855) – *New Essay on the Origin of Ideas* (1830); *Theosophy* (1859-74); *Sketch of Modern Philosophies* (1882; 1891)
Italian [Stresa]; Christian neo-Platonist ontology

9 *DARWIN, Charles* (1809-1882) – *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859); *The Descent of Man* (1871)
British [Cambridge]; Biological evolutionism (founder)

10 RENAN, Joseph Ernest (1823-1892) – *The Future of Science* (1848-49; 1890); *Philosophical Dialogues and Fragments* (1876); *Essays on Morals and Criticism* (1859)
French [Paris]; Scientific positivism; scepticism

11 *SPENCER, Herbert* (1820-1903) – *System of Synthetic Philosophy* (1862; 1896); *Principles of Ethics* (1879; 1893); *Principles of Psychology* (1855); *Social Statistics* (1850)
British [London]; Applied evolutionism

12 TAINÉ, Hippolyte (1828-1893) – *French Philosophers of the Nineteenth Century* (1857); *On Intelligence* (1870); *Philosophy of Art* (1881)
French [Paris]; Positivist anthropology

13 *NIETZSCHE, Friedrich* (1844-1900) – *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (1883-85; 1933); *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886); *Toward a Genealogy of Morals* (1887); *Joyful Wisdom* (1882; 1910); *Human, All Too Human* (1878-79)
German [Switzerland]; Nihilist immanentism

14 PEIRCE, Charles Sanders (1839-1914) – *Collected Papers* (1931-35; 1960); *Studies
in Logic (1883); Values in a Universe of Chance (1958); Chance, Love, and Logic (1923); Essays in the Philosophy of Science (1957)
American [Harvard]; Pragmatism

15 BRADLEY, Francis Herbert (1846-1924) – Principles of Logic (1883); Ethical Studies (1876); Appearance and Reality (1893)
British [Oxford]; Idealist Ethics, Metaphysics

16 FREGE, Gottlieb (1848-1925) – Foundations of Arithmetic (1884; 1950)
German [Jena]; Symbolic logic

17 DILTHEY, Wilhelm (1833-1911) – Systematic Philosophy (1907); Critique of Historical Reason (1890)
German [Berlin]; Historicist positivism

18 ROYCE, Josiah (1855-1916) – The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892); Essays upon Problems of Philosophy and of Life (1898); The World and the Individual (1901)
American [Harvard]; Individualist idealism

19 POINCARÉ, Jules (1854-1912) – Science and Hypothesis (1902; 1905); Science and Method (1905; 1914); The Value of Science (1905; 1907)
French [Paris]; Empiricist philosophy of science

20 *JAMES, William (1842-1910) – Pragmatism (1907); The Meaning of Truth (1909); A Pluralistic Universe (1909); Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912); Principles of Psychology (1890; 1892); The Will to Believe (1897); Some Problems of Philosophy (1911)
American [Harvard]; Pragmatism (founder); experimental psychology

French [Bordeaux]; Physical positivism; philosophy of science

22 SAUSSURE, Ferdinand de (1857-1913) – Course of General Linguistics (1916)
Swiss [Geneva]; Structural linguistics

23 DURKHEIM, Emile (1858-1917) – The Rules of Sociological Method (1894;1950); Sociology and Philosophy (1924)
French [Paris]; sociological positivism

24 *FREUD, Sigmund (1856-1939) – Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905); Interpretation of Dreams (1900); Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1919-20); The Ego and the Id (1923); The Future of an Illusion (1927); Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1904)
Austrian [Vienna]; Materialist anthropology; metapsychology
25 *HUSSERL, Edmund (1859-1938) – *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913; 1931); *Logical Investigations* (1900); *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1927)  
Austrian [Freiburg]; Phenomenology (founder)

26 *BERGSON, Henri* (1859-1941) – *Time and Free Will* (1889; 1910); *Creative Evolution* (1907); *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (1932); *Thought and Motion* (1934)  
French [Paris]; Vitalist evolutionism

27 *SCHELER, Max* (1874-1928) – *Formalism in Ethics* (1915); *Essence and Forms of Sympathy* (1918); *On the Eternal in Man* (1921); *The Position of Man in the Cosmos* (1928)  
German [Jena]; Phenomenology; Personalism

28 MOORE, George Edward (1873-1958) – *Principia Ethica* (1911; 1916); *A Defense of Common Sense in Contemporary British Philosophy* (1925); *Philosophical Studies* (1922); *The Refutation of Idealism* (1903)  
British [Cambridge]; Empiricism; ethical relativism

29 SCHILLER, Ferdinand Canning Scott (1864-1937) – *Humanism: Philosophical Essays* (1903; 1912); *Logic for Use: An Introduction to the Voluntarist Theory of Knowledge* (1929); *Our Human Truths* (1939)  
British [Oxford; California]; Pragmatic humanism

30 *DEWEY, John* (1859-1952) – *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920); *The Quest for Certainty* (1929); *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* (1910) *Experience and Nature* (1925); *Essays in Experimental Logic* (1916); *A Common Faith* (1934)  
American [Columbia]; Pragmatism; instrumentalism

31 WHITEHEAD, Alfred North (1861-1947) – *Process and Reality* (1929); *Adventures of Ideas* (1933); *Modes of Thought* (1938); *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13), with B. Russell [33]  
British [London; Harvard]; Logical idealism

Belgian [Louvain]; Transcendental neo-scholasticism

33 *RUSSELL, Bertrand* (1872-1970) – *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13; 1927-35); *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919); *Some Problems in Philosophy* (1912); *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914); *The Analysis of Mind* (1927); *An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth* (1940); *Human Knowledge* (1948); *Authority and the Individual* (1949); *Logic and Knowledge* (1956)  
British [Cambridge]; Mathematical logic; rationalist scepticism
34 VIENNA CIRCLE (1929-1936); Neo-positivist analytic philosophy
   [See its chief members: Wittgenstein (42); Ayer (50); Popper (51)]

35 STEIN, Edith [St. Teresa Benedicsta of the Cross, OCD] (1891-1942) – Finite
   and Eternal Being (1930); Act and Potency (1931); Husserl’s Phenomenology
   and St. Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy (1929); On the Problem of Empathy (1917)
   German [Muenster]; Phenomenology

36 TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, Pierre SJ (1881-1955) – The Phenomenon of Man
   (1940; 1959); The Divine Milieu (1926; 1960)
   French [Paris]; Transcendental evolutionism

37 BERDYAEV, Nikolai (1874-1948) – Freedom and the Spirit (1935); Slavery and
   Freedom (1939); The Fate of Man in the Modern World (1935); The Destiny of
   Man (1937); The Meaning of History (1936); The Beginning and the End (1941)
   Ukrainian [Moscow; Paris]; Spiritualism; Christian humanism

38 ORTEGA Y GASSET, Jose (1883-1955) – The Revolt of the Masses (1929; 1932);
   What Is Philosophy? (193?); History as a System (1941); Concord and Liberty
   (1940)
   Spanish [Madrid; Lisbon]; Existentialist pessimism

39 HARTMANN, Nicolai (1882-1950) – Principles for a Metaphysics of Knowledge
   (1921); The Construction of the Real World (1940); Possibility and Reality
   (1938); Ethics (1925)
   German [Gottingen]; Phenomenology

40 LE SENNE, Rene (1882-1954) – Introduction to Philosophy (1925; 1939); Duty
   (1930; 1950); Treatise on Characterology (1945); Personal Destiny (1951)
   French [Paris]; Philosophy of spirit; personalism; value theory

41 *JASPERS, Karl (1883-1969) – Philosophy, Reason, and Existence (1935; 1956);
   The Spiritual Situation of Our Time (1931); Philosophy (1932); Philosophical
   Faith (1948; 1949)
   German [Heidelberg]; Scientific existentialism

42 *WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig (1889-1951) – Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921;
   1922); Philosophical Investigations (1953); Philosophical Remarks on the Foun-
   dations of Mathematics (1956)
   Austrian [Cambridge]; Linguistic analysis

43 BLONDEL, Maurice (1861-1949) – Action (1893; 1936-37); Being and Beings
   (1935); Philosophy and the Christian Spirit (1944; 1946)
   French [Aix-Marseille]; Metaphysics of Action
44 MOUNIER, Emmanuel (1905-1950) – *Personalism* (1950; 1952); *What Is Personalism* (1947); *A Personalist Manifesto* (1936); *Existentialist Philosophies* (1946; 1948); *The Character of Man* (1946; 1956)
French [Paris]; Personalist existentialism

45 *MARITAIN, Jacques (1882-1973) – *The Degrees of Knowledge* (1932; 1938); *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (1953); *A Preface to Metaphysics* (1934; 1939); *Existence and the Existent* (1947; 1948); *Moral Philosophy* (1960; ‘64)
French [Paris; Princeton]; Neo-Thomism

46 MARCEL, Gabriel (1889-1973) – *The Mystery of Being* (1951); *Metaphysical Journal* (1927; 1952; 1947); *Being and Having* (1933; 1950); *The Philosophy of Existence* (1935; 1948)
French [Paris]; Christian existentialism

47 *HEIDEGGER, Martin (1899-1976) – *Being and Time* (1927; 1949); *Existence and Being* (1949); *The Question of Being* (1959)
German [Freiburg]; Ontological phenomenology

48 MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice (1908-1961) – *The Structure of Behavior* (1942; 1963); *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945; 1962); *The Adventures of the Dialectic* (1955; 1964); *Signs* (1960; 1964)
French [Paris]; Marxist phenomenology

49 BUBER, Martin (1878-1965) – *God and Evil* (1953); *Between Man and Man* (1947); *Eclipse of God* (1952)
Austrian [Frankfurt; Jerusalem]; Existentialism

British [Oxford]; Logical Positivism (Anti-metaphysics); Vienna Circle

Austrian [Vienna; London]; Philosophy of science; logical positivism

French [Paris; Chicago]; Neo-Thomism

53 ADORNO, Theodor (1903-1970) – *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944)
German [Frankfurt; California]; Neo-Marxist post-modernism
54 HORKHEIMER, Max (1895-1973) – *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944)
German [Frankfurt; California]; Neo-Marxist post-modernism

55 RYLE, Gilbert (1900-1976) – *Concept of Mind* (1949); *Revolution in Philosophy* (1957);
British [Oxford]; Linguistic analysis

56 CAMUS, Albert (1913-1960) – *The Fall* (1956; 1957); *The Rebel* (1951; 1953); *The Plague* (1947; 1948); *The Myth of Sisyphus* (1942; 1955); *The Stranger* (1942; 1946)
French [Algiers; Paris]; Nihilistic sisyphism

57 *SARTRE, Jean-Paul* (1905-1980) – *Being and Nothingness* (1943; 1957); *Existentialism Is a Humanism* (1946; 1948); *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960); *Paths to Freedom* (1945)
French [Paris]; Post-Marxist nihilist existentialism

German [New York]; Personalist phenomenology

59 GILSON, Etienne (1884-1978) – *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (1937); *The Philosopher and Theology* (1962); *Recent Philosophy: Hegel to the Present* (1966); *Being and Some Philosophers* (1952); *God and Philosophy* (1967); *The Elements of Christian Philosophy* (1963); *Methodical Realism* (1963; 1992)
French [Toronto]; Neo-Thomism

60 MARCUSE, Herbert (1898-1979) – *Eros and Civilization* (1955); *One-Dimensional Man* (1964); *Repressive Tolerance* (1965)
American [California]; Freudian neo-Marxist liberationism

61 FABRO, Cornelio (1911-1995) – *God in Exile: Modern Atheism* (1964; 1968); *From Essence to Existence* (1957; 1965); *The Soul: Introduction to the Human Problem* (1955); *History of Philosophy* (1959); *Phenomenology of Perception* (1961); *Perception and Thought* (1962); *Introduction to Existentialism* (1943); *Thomism and Modern Thought* (1969)
Italian [Rome]; Neo-Thomism

American [Pamplona; Dallas]; Neo-Thomism

63 PIEPER, Josef (1904-1997) – *Living the Truth* (1963; 1966); *In Defense of Philosophy* (1966; 1992); *The Silence of St. Thomas* (1957); *The End of Time* (1954); *Leisure, the Basis of Culture* (1952)
German [Muenster]; Neo-Thomism
64 LEVI-STRAUSS, Claude (1908- ) – *Mythologies* (1964-72); *Structural Anthropology* (1958; 1963)
French [Paris]; Structural linguistics; philosophical anthropology

German [New York]; Neo-classical

Austrian [Munich; Stanford]; Neo-classical

German [Heidelberg]; Hermeneutic theory of knowledge

American [Harvard]; Symbolic logic

French [Paris]; Postmodern structuralism

French [Paris]; Postmodern structuralism

British [Cambridge]; Neoclassical

German [Frankfurt]; Postmodern linguistic analysis

Canadian [Montreal]; Postmodernism

Scottish [Vanderbilt; Notre Dame]; Neoclassical Critique of postmodernism

American [Virginia]; Postmodern analytic philosophy
Polish [Krakow; Rome]; Personalist phenomenology

### Summary of Schools

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13. IMMANUEL KANT  
(1724-1804)

**Analysis:** Kant was the founder of systematic metaphysical idealism. His ideas about moral and legal topics must be sought within an elaborate and ambitious attempt to improve and enlarge science by uniting everything under one principle. He created his own categories, constructed his own concepts, and employed technical expressions that were meant to make his philosophy exotic and unavailable to public discourse. He thought the general discussion of philosophy outside the university could only cheapen and vulgarize it.

Kant drew a broad distinction between philosophy proper (the study of thoughts, or “noumena”) and empirical observation of experiences (“phenomena”). It was philosophy proper, or “metaphysics,” to which he devoted his labor to build a universal *a priori* system of reason. This was to be “theoretical” (as opposed to empirical), derived from “pure reason” (*a priori* intuition), and “critical” (going back to lay foundations in the first principles of reason, and not extending the development of any previous philosophical system).

Kant divided “metaphysics” into two broad areas: “morals” and “nature,” or the science of right/law (Recht) and the science of nature, or physics. Moral science was further sub-divided into ethics and jurisprudence. These two branches of morality were strictly segregated: Ethics was the study of personal or *private* Recht and *virtue*, as directed toward *internal* actions and duties. Here a person is subject to no other law than what he gives to himself. Jurisprudence was the study of *public* Recht and *justice*, as directed toward *external* actions and duties. It culminated in codified Law (Gesetz). Persons as citizens of a State are subject to no other law than what the Legislator sets before them.

As a consequence of this division, justice properly contains no ethical content or prescription of virtue. Duties of virtue are not to be legislated; only external morality can be legislated. Juridical duties are only external actions. To each of these areas of morality corresponds a set of “imperatives”: unconditional, practical propositions, or “maxims,” that command “duties.” These are the source of both private and public obligation. In private right we
follow a \textit{subjective} principle of action that results in rules or duties that we give to ourselves. When there is agreement between our actions and the maxim we have given ourselves, we are morally right.

In public right we are subject to an \textit{objective} principle of action, the “universal law of justice”: “Act externally in such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law” \textit{(Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Introduction, C)}. This is the public version of a “categorical imperative” that asserts what obligation is in general: “Act according to a maxim that can at the same time be valid as a universal law. You must first of all consider your actions according to their basic subjective principle…. When your reason puts this principle to the test of conceiving yourself as at the same time universally legislating by means of it, it qualifies for such a universal legislation” \textit{(Introduction, IV)}. It is important to note that both private and public maxims proceed from the will and command duties.

Private Recht is \textit{innate} in man. It belongs to each one by original grant of nature and is thus equivalent to natural right. In a condition of natural society (before the State) we have only one natural right: freedom (which for Kant is the negative condition of not being constrained). In private Recht, since juridical relations are absent, each man has a right to extend his maxims over all objects. Private right is the province of my will and my possessions. By “possession” Kant specified that he did not mean actual relations to objects in space and time, but the \textit{intelligible} union of my will with an object. Any interference would be an injury to me, a violation of my freedom. Owing to the metaphysical imperfection of a state of natural society, Kant thought the most responsible use of one’s freedom was the act of forming a civil society, a State.

Public Recht is \textit{acquired}. It is bestowed as positive right or statute law in the condition of civil society, or the State (properly so called). This is the condition of society under a supremely powerful will that unites all the members. Public Recht proceeds from a Lawgiver whose will is law for all: “A unilateral Will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone…. Therefore, only a Will binding everyone else—that is, a collective, universal (common), and powerful Will—is the kind of Will that can provide the guarantee required” that one’s possessions will be recognized by everyone as his external property \textit{(Fundamental Principles..., I, i, 8)}. By definition, the sovereign has rights without duties and can do no injustice. It fills entirely the field of Recht, and hence no scope remains for private rights. \textit{(This is a long stretch from Locke’s careful demarcation between the state and private prerogative.)}

The highest culmination of public right is the Constitution, which Kant said was “holy and irresistible,” for “it is an Idea that is an absolute command of practical reason judging in accordance with concepts of justice—a command binding on every people. Even if the organization of the State is defective by itself, still no subordinate authority can bring any active resistance against the legislative Chief. Any deficiencies attributable to him must be gradually removed by reforms, which he carries out by himself” \textit{(Appendix, Conclusion)}.
Kant added that the Idea of a pure republic would be the perfect Constitution, with supreme authority residing in the whole people controlled and directed by its Collective Will (reminiscent of Rousseau’s Social Contract).

Having arrived by *a priori* reasoning at the Idea of the State and its Constitution, it took Kant but one further step to reach a universal union of States (a World State) and its corresponding law. This seems to have been the final aim of his thought on the “metaphysics of justice,” what he regarded as the highest political good. For only such a State would make possible “perpetual peace,” as he argued in his essay of that title. Kant thus seems to have been the first systematic political philosopher to include a world state in his scheme. Having arrived at that summit, however, even if such an Idea was actually unrealizable, nevertheless, we are obligated to work toward it. (Hegel will shortly bring to a grand theoretical conclusion Kant’s development of this thought.)

Some consequences of the Kantian notion of State and law: The State exercises four great areas of exclusive right:

1) the just use of *coercion*, since the continued exercise of personal freedom would be inconsistent with universal laws. The State is authorized to “use coercion against anyone who violates justice” (Introduction, D).

2) the right to *punish* all offenses against civil society in proportion to the crime; it would be unjust to allow exemptions or to grant pardons.

3) the right of sole *proprietorship*, since it is the State that guarantees the administration of possessions by each citizen. (Here Kant makes no allowance for a Church to own property: “The Church is an institution founded on fraud and illusion; when, as a result of popular enlightenment, the terrible authority of the clergy will fall away, the State will, with full right, seize the property that has been usurped by the Church through testamentary wills” (Appendix, 8B).

4) the right of *obedience*, or unconditional submission to the sovereign will: “The origin of the supreme authority is...not open to scrutiny by the people...as though the right of obedience due it were open to doubt.... They cannot and may not judge otherwise than the present Chief of State wills.... It is the people’s duty to endure even the most intolerable abuse of supreme authority” (II, i, 49A). “Legislative authority over a people must be obeyed; this is so unconditional juridically that it is in itself punishable to inquire publicly into the title of his acquisition” of this authority. And he added: “This is a categorical imperative” (Appendix, 8 conclusion). (Note the development since Spinoza and Rousseau: Now it is treason even to *doubt* the legitimacy of State sovereignty. Kant hardly needed to add, though he did, that there is no right of revolution. his strictures are so severe because if the State should perish, and justice with it, “it is no longer worthwhile for men to remain alive on this earth” (II, i, 49E1).

**Evaluation:** Kant’s moral and legal philosophy presupposes much of the earlier state-of-nature and social-contract thought, but he clothes it in a new conceptual framework that renders it more forbidding and makes it more invulnerable to criticism. For example, he is more explicit than his
predecessors (with the possible exception of Hume) that MAN is the centerpiece of reality—and within man, REASON. Human reason is creator of all relationships there are, all the ground rules of being and acting. He is especially explicit in arguing that the only true juridical relationship is that of man to man. It is conceivable that there be a juridical relation of man to God, but since we cannot deal with God as an object of mental experience, our idea of God is something we make ourselves. Since we men put God in his place, there can be no such thing as divine justice. There is only human justice (Introduction, end).

When Kant bases his system on pure intuition (though he tries to make it more respectable by calling it “reason”), he is following the subjectivist orientation of Rousseau and making it theoretically possible to create his own systematic explanation of the meaning of everything in a way that cannot be challenged. In Kantian idealism, the ground determining thought is found not in objects external to the self but in the rational faculty itself.

By this a priori reasoning, Kant sought to make his system invulnerable to criticism. Since by definition his was the one true philosophy—founded on the only permissible assumptions—anyone taking exception to it would only demonstrate his ineptitude for philosophical work. Kant argued that there really was no philosophy prior to his “critical” thought, and since none could supersede it (there cannot be multiple philosophies), there was no basis for challenging him (Fundamental Principles..., Preface).

Hobbes had argued that his objective system was the only true one and therefore worthy of supplanting Aristotle and the medieval Schoolmen. Hume had argued that there was no one philosophy, for philosophy was subjective. Kant is arguing that his subjective system is the only true one; because subjectivity sets its own philosophical rules, it can by fiat exclude—“a priori”—all others. By definition, there can be no meaning outside Kantianism. In this way Kant attempts to combine subjectivism with universalism.

Since his system cannot be refuted on its own ground, the critic must either dismiss it altogether as the brainchild of an eccentric old man with prodigious persistence but little common sense, or demonstrate its true colors by pointing to some of its fruits.

For instance: There is no doubt that one effect of Kant’s moral teaching is to loosen the obligation to accept the natural law of human morality. His “imperatives” come very near to an individualized conscience that can establish its own moral norms—Rousseau’s moral subjectivism in more formal dress.

Moreover, Kant refuses to let us look to experience or observation for certification of the rightness of an action. To do that, he says over and over, would have no moral significance, since the validity of all metaphysics, including the metaphysics of morals, comes precisely from it’s a priori, non-empirical foundation. According to him, experiential or empirical morality lacks a brain (Introduction, B). We cannot know what is just or unjust, right or wrong, unless we abandon all fixed reference points in the external world of reality, and search for sources in our own “pure reason.” Thus, at every turn
Kant excuses himself from having to show a correspondence between what he maintains is true and the reality of everyday experience. But anyone who cares to do so can build his castles in that air.

If it is the case, as some have maintained, that it was an elevated, altruistic motive (“perpetual peace”) that was Kant’s ultimate motivation in building such a system, a peace culminating in the union of all States, then many might at least credit him with having a good intention.

**Primary Source:** *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1797-98).


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**18. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE**  
*(1844-1900)*

**Analysis:** For Nietzsche, a philosopher worthy of the name is above all a man of power: “As soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself, it always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the ‘creation of the world’” (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 9).

Starting from these militant premises, Nietzsche sets about creating his own new morality, which he triumphantly proclaims to be “a philosophy of the future.” The strong man is able to make his own morality, his own system of valuation. The stronger he is, the less he needs to rely upon its acceptance, and the more spontaneous his judgments. Growing out of instinctive drives and urges in man’s nature (the so-called Dionysian dimension of life—biological or purely physiological), the strong man liberates himself from social convention and moral norms from whatever source. He becomes a norm unto himself.

The key concept in Nietzsche’s ethic is *will*. Since the main thing in life is to *act*, and to act vigorously, one must first build up a strong and independent will, a “will to power.” “The highest and strongest drives...push the individual far above the lowlands of the herd conscience.” The goal is “a high and independent spirit, the will to stand alone” (*Beyond*, 201). Nietzsche’s paradigmatic man is the “higher man” for whom life is a ceaseless struggle to exceed his past and to dominate over “decadent men.” Like the Swiss mountains he made his home, highness, loftiness, independence, spontaneity are evidence of a superior will, the will that deserves to make its own rules and ceaselessly remake them, never conforming even to its own precedents.
Such a man thrives on opposition and unfavorable conditions, for they provide the challenge, the battleground on which to gain ever more strength, hardness, aggressiveness. Life becomes active, ceaseless struggle to maximize one’s will to power (much like what Hobbes understood by life in a “state of nature,” but for Nietzsche, it was not to be replaced by “civil society” as something better; it was itself the desirable condition for man’s life on earth). The sole aim of life is mastery. Living is “wanting to be different,” wanting to “impose your morality, your ideal, on nature,” wanting “all existence to exist only after your own image.” Even nature is to be overcome” (Beyond, 9).

The only relevant question for social life is: Who will be master and who will be slave? Members of the “herd” are fit for servitude, submission, conformity, modesty, mediocrity. The traditional morality is for them because it is a product of fear, a feeble attempt at self-protection. The new morality of the higher man unmasks the old morality as a produce of the “herd instinct.” “Egoism belongs to the nature of a noble soul…. Other beings must be subordinate by nature, and have to sacrifice themselves” (Beyond, 265).

Having thus prepared readers for his proclamation of social norms (justice, law), Nietzsche issues this teaching: The life of the higher man transcends “the old morality; the ‘individual’ appears, obliged to give himself laws and to develop his own arts and wiles for self-preservation, self-enhancement, self-redemption” (Beyond, 262). Legality is one more means in the power struggle for domination. Nietzsche envisions “legal order...as a means in the struggle between power complexes” (On the Genealogy of Morals, II, 11). If justice is considered the basis of legal obligation, it is a justice that “derives from egoism.” Indeed, the higher man can say: “I AM justice” (Human, All Too Human, 92). And since the self has life to the extent that it has a will to power, justice is a function of power (again, Hobbes). Nietzsche argued that the origin of obligation is “the feeling of superiority, human pride” (Genealogy, II, 8). In the case of the higher man, great power yields “great justice” (Beyond, 213, 262).

To practice justice in social relationships is to impose measures and settlements (laws) on those with less power. Legality is the process of subduing: “The institution of law [is] the imperative declaration of what in general counts as permitted, as just (right), ...and what counts as forbidden, as unjust (wrong)” in the eyes of the stronger power. “ ‘Just’ and ‘unjust’ exist, accordingly, only after the institution of the law.... To speak of just or unjust in itself is quite senseless; in itself, of course, no injury, assault, exploitation, destruction can be ‘unjust,’ since life operates essentially, that is, in its basic functions, through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction, and simply cannot be thought of at all without this character” (Genealogy, II, 11).

What, then, must rights and duties be in this context? Rights are “recognized and guaranteed degrees of power.... The right of others is the concession of our feeling of power among those others. When our power is...broken, our rights cease; on the other hand, when we have become a great deal more powerful, the rights of others cease” (The Dawn, 112).
**Evaluation:** A great deal of consistency runs through these writings of Nietzsche over the ten-year period surrounding his "illness," that strange psychosomatic condition that caused him so much pain and near despair, and ultimately led to his breakdown. One cannot, however, call them systematic. Nietzsche was not a systematic thinker or writer; his approach is that of a manifesto. He cannot, then, be said to have originated a systematic teaching about morality, justice, or politics.

Yet the strident and repetitious tone of his works has been extremely influential with 20th century man. He is regarded as one of the foremost existentialist philosophers of modern times. He played the role of prophetic spokesman of radical individualism, of "the autonomous man." Writing partly in reaction to the unrestricted state preached by a series of philosophers from Machiavelli to Hegel, and partly against self-complacent bourgeois society, he rushed to the opposite extreme of the morally irresponsible individual who forms a world unto himself.

Nietzsche’s defenders have tried to absolve him of complicity in the crimes of German National Socialism and other totalitarian excesses predicated on the idea of a master race or a higher man. His twisting of moral heroism from the struggle to overcome base appetites to the struggle to impose them on others has been a prime agent in the construction of a psychological and ethical support for numerous political adventurers. Nietzsche claimed to have foreseen that the 20th century would bring climactic global struggles of unprecedented savagery. To a certain extent, it was a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The logical outcome of Nietzsche’s "trans-valuation of all values" has been the rise of a new barbarism consequent upon the removal of self-restraint along with entitlement to unlimited satisfaction of base desires. It is difficult to regard him otherwise than as the mouthpiece of mankind’s oldest enemy, who in Nietzsche found a temperamentally well-disposed accomplice. The primitive outcry of pride, the “non serviam,” the urge to self-redemption, expressed itself in Nietzsche’s works through a great literary talent. His name has become symbolic of a new age where will replaces reason as the key to what is most human. We would follow at our peril this voice crying in anguished rebellion.

**Primary Sources:** *Human, All Too Human* (1878)—92, 96; *The Dawn* (1881)—112; *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future* (1885-86)—9, 201, 213, 262, 265; *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic* (1887)—I, 14; II, 6, 8, 11, 12; III, 9, 28.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY—THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

FOUR THOMISTS

JACQUES MARITAIN (1882-1973) French Catholic Convert
The quest for meaning requires full engagement with life through philosophy. The fullest, most complete set of philosophical tools is to be found in St. Thomas Aquinas’ reworking of Aristotle (Christian Philosophy).

Human problems can be understood and resolved only by recovering natural law and recognizing its universal applicability to human life. A correct social order can be built by understanding the relationship between the personal good and the common good. Human nature attains its full maturity in Jesus Christ (Christian Humanism). 

Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau

ÉTIENNE GILSON (1884-1978) French Catholic
A correct history of philosophy can discover lines of continuity in the immense variety of thinkers and schools. The Christian Middle Ages are timeless and still teach true philosophy. One finds the center of that history in the rational insights based on revealed truth as developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. Only in Christian philosophy does one find the correct relation between reason and revelation; there is no philosophy without prior theological premises. Historians need to leave a teaching and research institute to continue their work. A Gilson Reader

YVES SIMON (1903-1961) French Catholic
Christian philosophers take an optimistic, positive approach; they leave this life in the same way they lived it. A good philosopher has to be an inspiring teacher, gifted in the skills of transmitting his tradition and interpreting it in the contemporary context. Practical philosophy is to be emphasized in order to move beyond cultural artifacts to a firm rule of life that finds the right balance between work and rest. No organized society (community) can live without a confident authority.
The principles of democratic society fit well in the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition.

Work, Society, and Culture

JOSEF PIEPER (1904-1997) German Catholic
The happiest, best adjusted philosopher is the one who engages in contemplation because without it one cannot see the connection between reality and the good. Plato and Aristotle, the classical roots of Christian philosophy, provide the best access to the spirit and the letter of Thomism. A common sense philosophy for small communities of Christians must see and achieve the wholeness of man. The human and theological virtues come together in St. Thomas' philosophy of virtue.

An Anthology

FOUR PHENOMENOLOGISTS

MAX SCHELER (1874-1928) German Agnostic
The major task of philosophy is to study individual (personal) life and action. The most interesting question is what guides persons to their moral choices in an ethical system of values, ranked in order of their inherent goodness (worth). Values are perceived in lived experience—not by the mind but by the heart (feelings). Human persons act within a common order (commonality, community, solidarity). We all bear collective responsibility for what is done (and left undone); therefore we share a common guilt for whatever is wrong with the world.

Philosophical Perspectives

EDITH STEIN [ST. TERESA BENEDEICTA] (1891-1942) German Catholic Convert
The achievements of secular phenomenology enter Christian philosophy when synthesized with Thomism: Personal experiences (feelings, emotions) have to be understood within the context of objective reality: This is how we come to know who and what we are. A philosophical account of the human condition is possible only through access to God in contemplative prayer. The search for truth (philosophy) is a means to achieve spiritual wholeness (holiness).
The practical task of Christian philosophers is to heal broken hearts in a broken world.

*Self-Portrait in Letters*

DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND (1889-1977) German Catholic Convert
The infidelities of persons and societies result from the foolishness of contemporary philosophers.
Right reasoning in philosophy depends upon correct believing in theology. “Value” refers to what has excellence in itself; “reverence” is the correct response to it.
The aim of life is to incorporate into personal experience what has value in and of itself (primarily, beauty).
At the heart of life is loving and being loved, which requires purity of heart.

*The Art of Living*

KAROL WOJTYŁA [POPE JOHN PAUL II] (1920-2005) Polish Catholic
The central crisis of the modern age is a crisis of humanism (the truth about man).
Papal magisterium on reason, truth, good, and freedom is based upon philosophical work in the context of prayer.
In the light of Christian revelation, philosophers ought to focus on those fundamental realities if they are to be understood correctly and practiced faithfully.
The social and political implications of Christian personalism can cure the godless culture of contemporary society.

*Memory and Identity*

**TWO CRITICAL ANALYSTS**

GEORGE GRANT (1918-1988) Canadian Anglican Convert
Modernity perverts natural justice (right/good in itself) by making it serve self-interest.
Uncontrolled technology is responsible for frightful consequences in the world; the ground has to be cleared so that new flowers may grow in human culture.
Modern culture prizes easy enjoyment of high lifestyles devoid of substance. A practical atheism lies at the root of the nihilism and hopelessness of modern man; pessimistic hesitation cannot discover hopeful alternatives.

*George Grant: Selected Letters*
G. E. M. ANSCOMBE (1919-2001) English Catholic convert
The chief enemy of contemporary man is a pervasive culture of death.
Ethical ‘consequentialism’ (a sophisticated version of ‘the end justifies the means’)
amounts to nothing more than a new form of rationalization.
Intention is the principal element in evaluating the morality of human acts.
Justice (righteousness) has no substance unless it is an uncompromising, universally
applicable standard of human action.
Contemporary experimentation in bioethics betrays human dignity.
*Human Life, Action, and Ethics: Essays* [“Contraception and Chastity”]

**SEVEN LITERARY FIGURES**

CHARLES PÉGUY (1873-1914) French Catholic Convert
A stubbornly hopeful prophetic witness and religious mystic, he was a gifted poet
sensitive to the barbaric corruption of culture in modern times:
His work shows how and why modern men are but tourists in an alien land, unable to
settle down in a world that thwarts their most basic interests.
He also points to hopeful signs of future recovery through reconciliation.
Driven by a patriotic fervor and sense of heroic duty (akin to that of Joan of Arc),
he gave his life in defense of his native country.
*Men and Saints*

SIMONE WEIL (1909-1943) French Judeo-Catholic
A keen student of classical humanism, she looked for the antecedents of Christian culture
in the ancient Greek poets and philosophers.
She developed a religious, mystical metaphysics outside of organized belief systems
and independent of philosophical traditions.
Painfully sensitive to every injustice, her devotion to teaching was interrupted by social
activism and wartime protests.
She practiced a severe asceticism as personal witness to a disharmonious world and
gave up her life in solidarity with the victims of war.
*Simone Weil: An Anthology*

GABRIEL MARCEL (1889-1973) French Catholic Convert
He was a keen witness of the struggle of philosophical existentialists to overcome despair
and find a ground for hope in fidelity to the Christian tradition. As a dramatist, he used a rambling, consciously unsystematic style to engage the errors of contemporary ideologies. His work expresses a preference for the ordinary language of concrete human experience rather than intellectual abstractions. He concluded that the way back to God lies through engagement with other men.

*The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel ("Autobiographical Essay")*

**T.S. ELIOT (1888-1965) English Anglican Convert**

A metaphysical poet, dramatist, critic, and essayist who moved in literary circles with the aim of influencing the ideas that impact society. Consciously counter-cultural, his suffering in the “wasteland” of Modernity led to a personal struggle toward conversion. His eventual goal was to rebuild society on the foundation of Christian principles as the only viable alternative to the revival of paganism.

*The Idea of a Christian Society*

**FLANNERY O'CONNOR (1925-1964) American Catholic**

A strong woman, sane and witty, who explored the relationship between culture and personality on the assumption that everything in life is always under construction. The “good news” of salvation is best disclosed by jolting the reader to confront life’s grotesque experiences. Incarnation, death, and resurrection provide the basic themes for understanding the truth of the human condition. Prayer and suffering disclosed the intersections of faith and reason, grace and nature.

*The Habit of Being (Letters)*

**WALKER PERCY (1916-1990) American Catholic Convert**

In a series of philosophical novels he explored man’s dislocation in the modern age and provided accompanying clarifications in essays. His works combine existential questioning with a Catholic worldview in the cultural context of the American South.
Engaging in a pathology of the soul, he presents a strong reaffirmation of human life against contemporary dehumanization.

He combined culture criticism with Christian apologetics in the disguise of a pilgrim.

*Conversations with Walker Percy*

ALEK SANDR SOLZHENITSYN (1918-2008) Russian Orthodox

He spent his life effectively resisting modern totalitarian ideologies by means of poignant portrayals of their inhumanity in autobiographical fiction. His diagnoses apply to the soft totalitarianism of western democracies as well. His goal was to move beyond—and recover from—those experiences by confronting directly the radical lies about man that ideology-based regimes are built upon.

The evil that upsets all efforts to rescue modern man cuts across nations and states, classes and parties, to its origin in human hearts.

*The Solzhenitsyn Reader*