MORAL PHILOSOPHY
General Ethics—p. 1 / Social Ethics—p. 10 / Friendship—p. 25

MORAL PHILOSOPHY: General Ethics
Arnold Hall, July 1999
Professor John Gueguen

FIRST PART

INTRODUCTION

class 1 (July 13) – Orientation to the course; the contemporary context

1. What Is Ethics and What Is Its Purpose?
   “The Nature of Man and His Place in the Cosmos,” Redpath, 1983, 1
   “The Purpose of Human Life,” Bourke, 1951, ii
   “Morality and Human Life,” “The Good for Man,” McInerny, 1997, 1, 2
   “Living and Living Well,” “Good, Better, Best,” Adler, 1978, 10, 11
   “Introduction,” Dougherty, 1984
   “Goodness,” Hildebrand, 1965, 5
   “False Starts,” Shaw, 1982, 8
   on egoism, hedonism, existentialism, utilitarianism; Graham, 1990
   “Moral Values,” Adler, 1985, 5
   “Crisis of Conscience and Culture,” Haas, 1996
   “On MacIntyre’s *After Virtue,*” Boyle, 1987
   preface and postscript, Williams, 1985
   “Brief Remarks in Conclusion,” Maritain, 1968

class 2 (July 13) – A practical, normative science which is concerned with moral good

class 3 (July 14) – Survey of ethical theories

2. The Philosophical Discipline of Ethics
   *readings:* “Is a Philosophical Ethics Possible?” McInerny, 1993b, i
   “The Thesis;” “Objectivity as an Ethical Attitude;” “Summary;” conclusion, Pieper, 1963, intro., x, xi
   introduction, Crosby, 1996

class 4 (July 14) – The empirical foundation in moral experience
class 5 (July 15) – Different ways of thinking about moral knowledge: metaphysical and phenomenological

3. Ethics among the Other Disciplines
   “Ethics and Christian Philosophy,” Simon, 1934, 3.2
   “The Role of Faith in Moral Philosophizing;” “Faith, Philosophy, and Theology,” McInerny, 1993b, iii, iv

class 6 (July 15) – The human sciences (anthropology, biology, psychology, sociology, politics); the divine science (moral theology)

I—THE MORAL AGENT AND THE HUMAN ACT

4. The Person as Responsible Moral Subject
   readings: “Man as Person: A Personalist Approach to the Spiritual Nature of Man,” Crosby [Boyle, 1989]
   “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophical Formation;” “Personalist Ethics and Freedom,” Buttiglione, 1997, 3, afterword

class 7 (July 16) – Diverse conceptions of moral subject, author and end of human acts

class 8 (July 16) – The person as agent: theories of personal action

5. Voluntary Action
   readings: the moral act, John Paul II, 1993, 71-83
   “The Structure of the Human Act,” McInerny, 1997, 4

class 9 (July 16) – The free human act from its inception to its completion

class 10 (July 17) – Intentionality and the will’s direct and indirect object

class 11 (July 17) – Acts of the will in specific intentions and choices

6. Freedom
   readings: a perverse idea of freedom, John Paul II, 1995, 18-20
   freedom and law, John Paul II, 1993, 35-53
   “Freedom,” Burke, 1977, ii

class 12 (July 18) – Human freedom and responsibility in moral activity
7. Happiness

readings: “Thinking about Ends and Means,” “How to Pursue Happiness,” Adler, 1978, 9, 12
“Does Man Have a Natural Ultimate End?” McInerny, 1993b, ii
“Moral Experience and the Ultimate End,” Maritain, 1950, 5
“Will Being Good Make Me Happy?” Shaw, 1984
“Happiness Is...,” Shaw, 1982, 3

class 13 (July 18) – The natural desire for happiness as the end of the moral life

class 14 (July 19) – Metaphysical and utilitarian theories of happiness

class 15 (July 19) – Happiness in Christian ethics; orientation to God as basis for the moral life; the bearing of religion upon philosophical ethics

8. Reason and the Good

readings: “Good Habits and Good Luck,” Adler, 1978, 13
“Good and Evil Action,” “Character and Decision,” McInerny, 1997, 5, 6
“Good and Value,” Maritain, 1950, 2
“The Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason,” Pieper, 1963, v
“Virtue and Law in Aquinas: Some Modern Implications,” Kreyche, 1974
“Prudential Ethics,” Eschmann, 1997, ii A

class 16 (July 20) – Practical reasoning and the difference between moral good and evil

class 17 (July 20) – The virtues and vices as standards and measures of good and evil acts

class 18 (July 21) – The exercise of right reason with respect to moral principles and their application in practice

SECOND PART

II—PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL NORMS

9. The Natural Moral Law

“Law and Grace,” Redpath, 1983, 5

class 19 (July 21) – Universal principles of practical reason; primary and secondary precepts of the natural law
class 20 (July 22) – Human knowledge of the law of human nature and its function in the acquisition of moral virtues

class 21 (July 22) – The impact of circumstantial changes on the observance of natural moral norms; the problem of moral relativism

10. Moral and Legal Norms

readings: civil law and moral law, John Paul II, 1995, 68-74

class 22 (July 23) – The different interests of morality and legality in respect to the human good

class 23 (July 23) – Absolute moral prohibition of intrinsically evil acts

11. Particular Moral Knowledge

conscience and truth; fundamental choice and specific kinds of behavior, John Paul II, 1993, 54-70
“Conscience and Moral Obligation,” Bourke, 1951, vii
“Prudence and Conscience,” McInerny, 1997, 7
“Conscience,” Burke, 1977, I

class 24 (July 23) – The exercise of prudence in specific moral situations

class 25 (July 24) – The practical truth and prudential choices

class 26 (July 24) – Moral conscience and its guidance in the moral life; the formation of conscience

12. Moral Judgment

readings: “The Ultimate Practical Judgment,” Simon, 1934, 1
“Emotions,” Redpath, 1983, 4

class 27 (July 25) – The unity of practical reason: the object and the purpose of a human act in its particular surrounding circumstances

class 28 (July 25) – Moral evaluation of the influence of the passions on human acts
class 29 (July 25) – The bearing of indirect effects (unintended consequences) and of material cooperation in evil on the morality of an act; proportionalism and consequentialism
III—THE MORAL VIRTUES AND THE MORAL LIFE

13. The Need for Virtue
   readings: “The Moral Life in Practice,” Gilson, 1941, ii
   “Prologue,” DeMarco, 1996
   A Brief Reader on the Virtues of the Human Heart, Pieper, 1941

   class 30 (July 26) – Virtue as human excellence and as operational habitude
   class 31 (July 26) – Virtue as restraint against evil and as motivation for goodness
   class 32 (July 27) – Moral and intellectual virtues

14. Moral Virtue and Vice

   class 33 (July 27) – Habitudes and free choice; interconnectedness of the moral virtues
   class 34 (July 27) – The acquisition of human virtues and formation toward Christian holiness

15. The Cardinal Virtues
   readings: courage, justice, prudence, temperance, DeMarco, 1996
   “Justice, Wisdom, Courage, and Moderation,” Conclusion, Kreeft, 1986, 4

   class 35 (July 28) – Temperance, related virtues and opposing vices
   class 36 (July 28) – Fortitude, related virtues and opposing vices
   class 37 (July 29) – Justice, related virtues and opposing vices
   class 38 (July 29) – Prudence, related virtues and opposing vices
   class 39 (July 30) – The organic role of the cardinal virtues in the Christian life--foundation of the theological virtues, primarily love and friendship

CONCLUSION

   class 40 (July 30) – questions for study and discussion, Redpath, 1983
COURSE READINGS

Aristotle, Εθικων Νικομαχηειων [tr. Irwin, 1985]

“Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy, Adler, 1978
“The Discovery of Ethics,” Maritain, 1968
“In Quest of Ethical Knowledge,” Veatch, 1962

St. Thomas Aquinas, In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio
[tr. Litzinger, 1964]

----- Summa Theologiae, I-II, 1-100; II-II, 47-169 [tr. Rickaby, 1896]

----- Quaestiones disputatae: de Malo [tr. Oesterle, 1998]

Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, McInerny, 1997
The Moral Wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas, Redpath, 1983
“The Thomistic Theory of Morals,” Gilson, 1941
“Ethics,” McInerny, 1993a
“How to Be Happy,” Davies, 1992
“St. Thomas’s Approach to Moral Philosophy,” Eschmann, 1957

Pope John Paul II, on Christian philosophy; on St. Thomas Aquinas, 1998 (76, 104, 106; 57-59, 43-44, 78)

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY


- - - - - Ten Philosophical Mistakes (New York: Macmillan, 1985)

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985)
384-322 BC  bk I -- Happiness and Goodness (paraphrase, John Gueguen)
           bk II -- Virtues in General (paraphrase, John Gueguen)
           bk III -- Voluntariness, Decision, Desire; Fortitude and Temperance
           bk IV -- Generosity, Magnificence, Magnanimity and related Virtues
           bk V -- Justice
           bk VI -- Intellectual Virtues
           bk VII -- Restraint and Unrestraint; Pleasure and Pain
              (bks VIII and IX -- Friendship)
           bk X -- Pleasure; Happiness; Moral Education (paraphrase, J. Gueguen)

Bourke, Vernon J., Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1951)


Burke, Cormac, Conscience and Freedom (Manila: Sinag-Tala, 1977); part I reprints as Scepter Booklets 66 (1977) and 136 (1982)


DeMarco, Donald, *The Heart of Virtue* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1996)


Gilson, Etienne, *Moral Values and the Moral Life* (St. Louis: Herder, 1941) 1884-1978


--- *Veritatis Splendor [The Splendor of Truth]*, 6 August 1993

Kreeft, Peter, *Back to Virtue* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1992 [1986])


- - - - An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962)

- - - - Moral Philosophy (New York: Scribner, 1968)

- - - - “Ethics,” The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. N. Kretzmann and E. Stump (Cambridge: University, 1993a)
- - - - The Question of Christian Ethics (Washington: Catholic Univ., 1993b)


- - - - The Four Cardinal Virtues (Notre Dame: University, 1996 [1954])
- - - - Reality and the Good (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1989; Die Wirklichkeit und das Gute, 1963)


Shaw, Russell, Choosing Well (Notre Dame: University, 1982)
- - - - “Will Being Good Make Me Happy?” Scepter Booklet 144 (1984)

*Critique de la Connaissance morale*, 1934)


**St. Thomas Aquinas**, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, tr. C. I. Litzinger,
O.P. (Chicago: Regnery, 1964; Notre Dame: Dumb Ox, 1993)
1225-1274
- - - - *On Evil: Disputed Questions*, tr. John and Jean Oesterle (Notre Dame: University, 1998)

- - - - *Summa Theologiae*, I-II and II-II; *Aquinas Ethicus: The Moral Teaching of St.
  I-II QQ 1-48 (On Happiness; Human Acts and Passions)
  49-89 (On Habits, Virtues and Vices)
  90-100 (On Law)
  II-II QQ 47-56 (On Prudence)
  57-122 (On Justice)
  123-148 (On Fortitude)
  149-170 (On Temperance)

**Veatch**, Henry B., *Rational Man: A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics* (Bloomington:
Indiana Univ., 1962)

  1994)


**Wojtyła**, Karol, *Toward a Philosophy of Praxis*, ed. A. Bloch and G. T. Czuczka (New York:
Crossroad, 1981)
  “The Controversy about Man” (1976)
MORAL PHILOSOPHY: Social and Political
Shellbourne Conference Center, July 2004
John Gueguen, professor

The Course in General

This course treats sociability, the proper (connatural) dimension of the human person that expresses itself in the formation and development of communities ordered by a common good—the good of the whole—distinct from an individual’s good and often in tension with it. We recall and move beyond the principles of general ethics to what Aristotle called the second part of practical philosophy, or “politics.”

Today social and political studies emphasize circumstantial and unique phenomena and the constant changes that occur within each society, rather than the permanent principles that govern all societies and form the basis for social changes. A correct understanding of the particular presupposes knowledge of universal reality as experienced always and everywhere at every level of human association, from friendship and family life to cities, states, and the global community.

Besides the common good, these universals include social character, the social virtues which perfect that character (primarily prudence, obedience, and justice), the duties and rights entailed in citizenship, the authority and power to govern, work, property, the production, exchange, and consumption of material goods, social and political organization (primarily democracy and the republic), and constitutional law.

These principles derive from man’s social nature, are perceived by reason, and verified by experience. They serve as guidelines in devising policies and programs intended to approximate them as closely as possible in the actual circumstances of social life. As in general ethics, we distinguish between a science (ἐπιστήµη) of society and the art (τέχνη) that applies it in the permanently imperfect conditions of social life. Aristotle, the founder of ethics (ηθική) and politics (πολιτική), resolved the dialectic between science and art—the principle or ideal [τό μέσον] and the circumstantially possible [τό δυνατόν]—into what he called the proper goal of practical action (τό πρέπον). Theorists who aim for more than that are called ideologists.

As this course belongs to a curriculum in Christian philosophy, its philosophical content—what is known by reason and experience—takes into account the theological content—the data of divine Revelation and the magisterial teachings of the Church—to be studied later in “Justice and the Social Doctrine of the Church” (Moral Theology IV).
This Course in Particular

In previous years, the class has interpreted classical texts in the science and art of politics. The students read brief passages from the standard authorities listed in the bibliography, and class discussion brought out their meaning. This summer a more “issues-oriented” presentation seems advisable because of the deepening “moral crisis” in American private and public life. The body politic, under siege from an ideologically corrupted mass media and disoriented public officials, seems confused or in denial about what J. Budziszewski calls “what we can’t not know.” Many of our contemporaries are in danger of losing their bearings with a resulting inability to understand or apply the principles of social and political philosophy.

Four decades ago, it was already apparent “that our national ideal no longer rests upon a foundation of broad and solid popular morality. Ignorance of moral principles and the rejection of the very notion of morality are on the rise today and threaten to undermine our nation and its traditions. The evidence of moral decline is everywhere to be seen. This present moral deterioration cannot be interpreted as a merely temporary relaxation of standards which will be followed by the sort of moral reform past experience would lead us to expect. The conditions we face are unique…. Many are questioning and often denying the objective distinction between good and evil and the ability of human reason to know with certainty what is right and wrong. They are cutting themselves off completely from moral traditions. For the first time in history they find themselves without a moral law to break.” (“Unchanging Duty in a Changing World,” Annual Report of the N.C.C.B., Nov. 19, 1961)

As the bishops predicted, this “moral revolution” has surged forward to the point where even the boundaries of common sense have been breached. It has overwhelmed public opinion even among the most educated people, subjecting everything to “redefinition,” even human nature. By looking into several specific issues, we will try to assess the dimensions, locate the causes, and consider appropriate strategies for counteracting this revolution in American public morality.

Most new books by professional experts in the social sciences deal with policy concerns that offer little assistance in identifying those key issues. Surely they lie at a deeper level than “homeland security,” “restoring fiscal sanity,” “increasing voter turnout,” “saving social security,” “welfare reform,” “climate change”—a few of the topics identified by the Brookings Institution as “Election Issues for 2004.” The recent election year guide published by the American bishops centers around four “moral priorities” which are more fundamental: “protecting human life,” “promoting family life,” “pursuing social justice,” and “practicing global solidarity” (“Faithful Citizenship: A Catholic Call to Political Responsibility,” 2003).

For the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, those key moral issues can be reduced to one: “solidarity”—the practical recognition of human interdependence and application of the principle of the common good to social, economic, and political life within and among human communities. Those areas calling for special consideration include family solidarity (threatened
at both ends of the life cycle), intergenerational solidarity (threatened in the economic order by the aging of the population), and international solidarity (threatened by unbridled globalization). These issues are interconnected and overlapping. Unless they are properly addressed, violence inevitable ensues (abortion, euthanasia, crime, warfare, and terrorism).

Our task in this course is to take a careful look at what is happening in families, the workplace, and the world around us that makes it more and more difficult for our contemporaries to recognize and practice the virtue of solidarity. In our country that virtue is obscured by radical individualism and a contractarian approach that generates economic and legal conflict rather than cooperation among individuals and groups. Human rights are reduced to self-centered demands. Legislators and judges try to separate “personal moral standards” from “public actions” as if there could be two conflicting moralities, private and public.

We Christian philosophers need to exercise more effective leadership in our professions and other spheres of influence so as to help people recover their knowledge of “what we can’t not know”—the first step in dealing with contemporary social problems that challenge us to know well the permanent principles of social and political philosophy so as to fulfill our human and divine calling in the secular arena. Before we can “evangelize the culture,” we have to humanize it.

**Course Reading**

Assignments are drawn from J. Budziszewski, *What We Can’t Not Know: A Guide* (Dallas: Spence, 2003). Some additional references are available, and should be surveyed for possible future consultation.

**Course Topics**

**INTRODUCTORY**

*CLASS 1, 2*

1. The relation between ethics and politics; metaphysical and anthropological foundations (the good; the human being); relation to the modern social sciences; relation to the social doctrine of the Church; persons in society—the sociability of human life; “hoosier” philosophy.

**PART I: FOUNDATIONAL PREMISES**

*CLASS 3, 4*

2. General orientation to human life in Christian realist philosophy – Man’s calling to communion with God: the dignity of all human persons; implicit and explicit orientation to God as origin and end of human life; ethics and religion; moral and religious implications of the natural need to associate with others.
3. The fundamental reality of human sociability – Human goodness as both personal and communal; the common good as the realization of cooperative relations with other persons in respect and love; fundamental rights and duties of every human being; implications for the natural environment (ecology; “animal rights”).

4. Applications of the principle of the common good – Specific rights and duties; the principle of solidarity; collegiality (in the workplace, in civil society); diversity of circumstances: cultural pluralism and toleration; patriotism within the world community; disorders: prejudice, nationalism, and racism; social ideologies (feminism).

PART II: SOCIAL LIFE

CLASS 5, 6
5. Ethical norms applicable to friendships – The most elementary form of human association; moral relationships among friends; the missions of family, school, church, and the broader cultural environment in educating for friendship.

6. Respect for life – Recognizing the value of the person, of the human body; immorality of euthanasia, abortion, and genetic manipulations of life; warfare and other forms of violence; roots of the culture of death in contemporary social life.

CLASS 7, 8
7. Marriage and the family – The basic natural unit of social life; the institution and indissolubility of the marital union; perfecting the individuality of spouses and children within the larger family unit.

8. Conjugal and parental love – Integration of sexual attraction with love for one person; conjugal love and procreation as its natural purpose; the rights and duties of paternity and maternity; education of the offspring.

9. Conjugal and familial disorders – Separating the unitive and procreative ends of marriage (contraception), causes and consequences; the divorce mentality and the rise of invalid marriages due to defective matter or intention; child abuse.

CLASS 9, 10
10. The natural obligation to work – Personal and social dimensions of work; the notion of professional work; the worker as subject and as object.

11. Justice in work relationships – Duties and rights associated with professional life; worker-employer relations; forms of ownership and their social limits.
12. Role of government in work relationships – Workers and managers as citizens with rights and obligations; economic applications of the principle of subsidiarity.
13. Work and the economic order – The nature and limits of the market, its structures and procedures; moral implications of production, exchange, and consumption; disorders in a consumer society.

PART III: POLITICAL LIFE

CLASS 11, 12
14. Social and political institutions – The nature and forms of political organization; diversity of regimes (constitutions); democratic society and republican government, their moral underpinnings; excesses of modern totalitarian regimes; attempts to organize world society; excesses of globalization; alliances among regimes.

15. Principles of civic justice – The primacy of justice in working toward the common good; distributive and commutative justice; the threat of modern utilitarianism to a social ethic based on justice.

16. The modern notion of social contract – Reconciling contractualism and its premises about civil society with metaphysical principles of philosophical realism.

CLASS 13, 14
17. The person and the common good – Integration of justice and the common good through a personalist orientation to political life; the notion of inter-subjectivity.

18. Rights and duties of citizens – Moral obligations of government officials (legislators, administrators, judges) toward the body of citizens; basing political dialogue on the truth about man in civil society.

CLASS 15, 16
19. Responsibility for public morality – The role of public opinion and its formation; contributions (positive and negative) of communications media; political applications of the principle of subsidiarity.

20. Public and private educational institutions – The role of schools in the moral formation of citizens and government officials; duties of teachers and administrators in promoting the common good with respect for the freedom of persons and families.

CLASS 17, 18
21. The scope of public law – Harmonizing positive laws with the laws of human nature; the prevalence of legal positivism; the role of legal institutions in the moral formation of citizens and public officials; just and unjust laws in imperfect societies.

22. Moral aspects of political disorder -- Justice and the treatment of crime and punishment; limits of legitimate civil disobedience and resort to violence; moral and immoral means of redressing grievances; revolutionary ideologies and warfare.
PART IV – CONCLUSIONS

CLASS 19, 20

23. Review of the principles of social and political philosophy; possibilities and limitations in putting them into practice; challenges facing the exercise of social and political leadership among imperfect human beings in an imperfect world.

24. Applications of the principles in the key issues of the day: marriage and the family; intergenerational relationships; global solidarity. Major insights along the way; resolutions for possible adoption.

REFERENCES


-----, The Resurrection of Nature: Political Theory and Human Character (1986); especially chapter 4.


Rev. Joseph de Torre, Contemporary Philosophical Issues in Historical Perspective (2001); part III.


Jude P. Dougherty, Western Creed, Western Identity: Essays in Legal and Social Philosophy (2000); part II.

Robert P. George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality
(1993); especially chapters 1 and 7.


Russell Hittinger, *The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World* (2003); especially part II.


Frank Sheed, *Society and Sanity* (1953); parts II and III.

Yves R. Simon, *A General Theory of Authority* (1962); part II.


Leo Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin, *An Introduction to Political Philosophy* (1989); part I.


Karol Wojtyła, ed. A. Bloch and G. Czuczka, *Toward a Philosophy of Praxis* (1981); chapter 2.

MATERIALS FROM PREVIOUS SEMESTERS

A. Distinction between Individual and Person

(Maritain, chapter 1)

One and the same human being is an individual (in one sense) and a person (in another sense). It is important to recognize and correctly understand this fundamental distinction in man’s ontological status, and its social/political implications.

INDIVIDUALITY is the material aspect (potentiality) of a human being (a man having ontological roots in matter). Emphasis is on the body, which is constricted by space and restricted by time, subject to the laws of the physical world.

It is the concrete state of an existing human being, one unit distinct from all other material individuals, the only being capable of exercising the act of existence (esse). As an individual, a man’s unity is precarious, relative; it tends to scatter and fragment, because an individual is but a fragment of the human species, incapable of complete action, a dependent part.

PERSONALITY is the spiritual aspect (actuality) of a human being (a man having ontological roots in spirit). Emphasis is on the immortal soul and its faculties (intellect and will), which makes it possible for man to perfect himself through knowledge and love, to communicate these to and with other persons as free gift.

It expresses itself independently, as a whole capable of exercising existence by itself, the source of unification within us that expands outward continuously and generously. It constitutes a universe unto itself, a whole within the greater whole of all persons, and subject only to the transcendent whole (God). As a person, a man is the most noble and perfect being in all of nature, fully self-sufficient, and thus like God.

B. The Person and the Common Good

(Maritain, chapter 8)

1. It is difficult to form a correct idea of society because each of its members is in his existential entirety an individual and in his essential entirety a person; that is, each one is both a whole and a part of a whole (in those different respects). Thus the society (an association of equal persons) is at the same time a community (composed of unequal and interchangeable individuals).

2. Both person and society are wholes and must respect each other as distinct kinds of whole required by human nature. In principle, their ends (the goods toward which they aim) are not incompatible, but enrich each other, and the same is true of the actions (both personal and social) that are means to those ends. But due to the imperfection of our disordered nature and the human condition in time, many practical incompatibilities do occur; these must be resolved by prudential decisions within the demands of justice.

3. Personal wholeness is expressed as substantial or subsistent unity of being and action; social wholeness is expressed as accidental unity of being and action. Thus these persons only
happen to be living in *this* society. But so long as they do live in it, they have a serious responsibility to participate in its life and contribute toward its excellence; they have a stake in its goodness, as it does in theirs. Each helps the other to fulfill its purpose.

4. When a society achieves its common good (a terrestrial and limited goal)—to the extent that may be possible in an imperfect world—the personal goods of its members (which transcend earthly limitations) also benefit, to the extent that the universal common good (union with God) is served.

C. Basic Natural Groups
*(Wild, chapter 10)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final Groups</th>
<th>Instrumental (Functional) Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life-Sustaining</td>
<td>Life-Completing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY (tribe, race, nation)</td>
<td>FRIENDSHIP groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL SOCIETY (body politic, <em>polis</em> arts)</td>
<td>RELIGIOUS groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despotic/Democratic bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD COMMUNITY (global organization)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[Note: each group has its final, efficient, formal, and material cause; its own necessary authority; and is regulated by social justice.]

D. Distinction between Society and Community

*Social Life (Culture, Politics of Ius): The Perspective of Personality*

Human beings in social life are *wholes* in themselves, each with his own dignity and supernatural destiny; citizenship in the City of God is the final end of every person as he perfects in the earthly city the *spiritual* bonds (marriage and citizenship) which link him to other persons in social relationships characterized by *authority* and *obedience*; there is an *equality* of both
natural and conventional (legal) rights in situations governed by commutative justice. Each person finds himself in the center of concentric circles of association with other persons (societies), from the most intimate inner circles of friends and family members outward to less intimate circles of private and public relationships, local, regional, national, and international.

Community Life (Tradition, Government of Lex): The Perspective of Individuality

Human beings in community life are small parts of greater wholes; the end of every individual is to contribute what he can to the material and intellectual common good through relationships characterized by power and subjection; there is inequality (inferiority and superiority) of natural and conventional (legal) duties in situations governed by distributive justice (contractual bonds). Each individual finds himself in hierarchical association with other individuals, from the most elementary communities (families and partnerships in the domestic order) upward to the larger, more complex, and anonymous communities of the public order (culminating in the state). These levels of community are coordinated, subordinated, and finalized in such a way that the common good and peacefulness of each community participates more or less imperfectly in the universal (subsistent) Common Good and Peace of the created universe.

E. Distinction between Civil Society and State (Maritain, chapter 7)

1. Civil society (the body politic, the people, πόλις, civitas) comes second after the family in sustaining the social life of man; it is the most complete ("perfect," in the technical sense) of human associations in that it is capable (in theory) of fulfilling the human need for "the good life." Like the family, it is a social whole, a moral subject of rights and duties, an organic, living, growing unity. Its relationships are regulated by justice and completed by civic friendship. It thrives on the devoted concern of its members and their mutual gift of themselves. Its authority in making decisions about common action derives from within it, from the people themselves, and is delegated to representatives who act in its name. Its common good is the good life of the whole and of the persons who compose the civic body, whom it helps to perfect. Its component elements are all-inclusive and communicable: services and commodities; customs, laws, and institutions; an historical heritage with cultural symbols, traditions, and treasures; a social character with freedom, virtue, and conscience; material prosperity and spiritual wealth. It fosters rectitude, heroism, and happiness.

2. The state (government, constitution, πολιτεία, res publica) is the topmost functional or instrumental part of the political community, a subordinate set of interdependent agencies staffed by hired agents of the people who serve as specialized experts entrusted with specific and limited powers to devise and implement the means for promoting the general welfare and public order (which are included in the common good), and in general to administer the public affairs of and for the people. It is not a moral person, but an impersonal work of art without rights or duties of its own, a rational superstructure built and maintained by men over many generations in response to the community's natural need for organization. It produces a system of regulations that extend throughout the community, unifying it, equipping it for common action, and distinguishing it
from all other communities. It is entitled to exercise power over the individuals who compose the community, which is how it exercises the authority delegated by the people to its elected or appointed representatives for the purpose of supervising and carrying out the public business. In accord with distributive justice, it strives to serve the body politic impartially and efficiently at the public expense.

3. **Tension between civil society and state**: The body politic must be alert for the government’s inherent tendency to take matters into its own hands (bureaucratization) by developing an artificial life, good, and rights of its own, as if it were the whole community rather than its highest part. The body politic must resist this tendency to increase power and expense beyond what is necessary, thus usurping the prerogatives of the people by expanding toward self-sufficiency. In the modern world, too much of social life (especially in the private sector) has come under the control of the state, contrary to the principle of subsidiarity.

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### F. Distinction between Law as *Ius* and as *Lex*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Ius</em></th>
<th><em>Lex</em></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>(Man’s natural life is composed of informal social and political acts.)</em></td>
<td><em>(Man’s conventional life is situated of formal institutions of civic community.)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iustitia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consuetudo</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Stable but imperfect disposition of character.)</em></td>
<td>*(Imperfect human expression of unwritten <em>Lex Naturalis.)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lex Humana</strong></td>
<td><em>(Written expression of positive norms consistent with <em>Lex Divina</em>—vetus, nova; as limited by <em>Lex Fomitis.</em>)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iurisprudentia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Legislationis</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(The art of putting it into practice.)</em></td>
<td><em>(The art of enacting it in stable formulas.)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ius Aeterna</strong></td>
<td><strong>Lex Aeterna</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Ultimate grounding in <em>God’s</em> mind.)</em></td>
<td><em>(Ultimate grounding in <em>God’s</em> mind.)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Common errors in practice:

- Legalism (there is no *ius*, but only *lex.*)
- Positivism (*lex* creates its own *ius.*)
- Moralism (*ius* creates its own *lex.*)
- Antinomianism (there is no *lex*, but only *ius.*)
## G. Foundations; Institutions; Challenges

### 5 FOUNDATIONS

1. Man’s calling to *communion* with his Creator and fellow creatures: the infinite, inalienable *dignity* of every man; our natural *rights* and *obligations*.

2. Human *sociability* (the social dimension of human nature).

3. Human *goodness*, both personal and communal.

4. The *common good* as goal of all social action.

5. Correlative principles of *subsidiarity* (individual and community) and *solidarity* (person and society).

### 10 INSTITUTIONS

1. **Friendships**, the elementary particles of society.

2. **Families**, the foundational social unit; the natural institution of *marriage* (its 3 *bona*).

3. **Work**, its social dimension and impact on culture; the *worker* as subject; professional work.

4. The **economy** and economic life; the *market*, its relationships (production, exchange, consumption).

5. **Politics** and political life; forms of political organization; the diverse *regimes* corresponding to diverse civil societies (forms of *government*: powers).

6. Civic **justice (commutative)**—between citizens as persons; **distributive**—between government and citizens as individuals, as means of coordinating personal and common goods.

7. The exercise of political **authority** and

### 15 CHALLENGES

1. Resolving conflicts and tensions between personal and common goods.

2. Resolving tensions between unity and diversities within society (toleration, its limits).

3. Resolving tensions between the universal and the particular (patriotism, its limits).

4. Building a culture of life; resisting the culture of death.

5. Safeguarding marriage and family life from threats to undermine them.

6. Building justice and collegiality in the work place and in the profession; government’s role in work and market relationships; controlling its tendencies to excess.

7. Avoiding the extremes of individualism and collectivism in markets and professions.

8. Conserving the natural environment (minerals,
obedience (in societies), plants, animals) of power and subordination (in governments).

9. Controlling the threat of utilitarian relativism in civil society (injustices)

8. Public morality; ethics and public policy; responsibilities of persons, families, communications media, and educational institutions.

10. Developing public policies in all areas of social life which respect the principles in the context of actual conditions and realistic possibilities.

9. Public laws, constitutional and statutory; their role in the moral formation of citizens and public officials; coordinating natural and positive laws in the judicial process.

11. Influencing and forming public opinion.

10. The international order; the universal dimension of economic and political life; global cooperation and peace.


13. Making civil laws contribute to justice and inhibit injustice; clarifying the means to redress grievances caused by unjust laws, policies.

14. Controlling political disorders (crime) through law enforcement and corrections.

15. Dealing with international violence (revolution, war, terrorism).

H. Previous Exam Questions

Prefatory Note: It is better to show how the course materials have helped you to deal with these questions than merely to repeat what was said in class or in the readings. The exam is meant to disclose what has become a part of your store of philosophical knowledge so that you can now “run with it.”

1. Terms to be defined: social act; social character; natural right; solidarity; subsidiarity; common good.
2. Why are social rights/duties different from individual rights/duties? Does this confront us with a “double standard”?

3. Since constitutions and governments are man-made (conventional, rather than natural), are they exempt from moral requirements? For example: Is it morally permissible for government agents to practice deception and even to kill people?

4. Has the course helped to clarify the proper course of action when the common good conflicts with the good of an individual?

5. Why did we encounter so many frustrations and ambiguities in this course?

6. Explain this ambiguity: That human beings are both equal and unequal.
7. And this one: Property is both private and public.

1. And this: Rights are both natural and conventional. How are natural rights different from positive rights?

9. Are you clear about the distinction between morality and legality? Why do most law professors, legislators, and judges insist on separating them?

10. Are you clear about the distinction between authority and power?

11. Why do so many of our contemporaries question and even reject the premises and conclusions of this course? How have we uncovered the roots of contemporary moral relativism?

12. Terms to be defined: pragmatism; utilitarianism; positivism; behaviorism.

13. Does culture have moral value? Are some cultures more valuable than others?

14. What’s wrong with the social contract doctrine, and what implications does that have for being a good citizen in our country?

15. What kind of moral obligation do citizens have to obey the laws? Is it ever permissible to obey an unjust law?

16. What are the different forms of justice, and how are they related?

17. How do the principles we learned in this course help resolve issues like affirmative action; day care; multi-culturalism; civil disobedience (conscientious objection); sex education in schools; capital punishment; globalism.

18. Is “values clarification” in current educational theory consistent with the principles we learned in this course?
19. Do parents have a moral obligation to have as many children as possible?

20. Is poverty a moral evil? Is the accumulation of great wealth?

21. Are economic systems morally indifferent? What about political systems?

22. How is politics different from government? How is nation different from state?

23. From what sources are civil (human) laws derived?

24. How do the principles of social and political philosophy bring light to the whole area of professional ethics? In what ways is the choice and practice of a career subject to moral principles?

25. Evaluate the reading materials used in this course that you found most/least helpful. Which one do you most look forward to reading more carefully?
The purpose of this course is to gain deeper insights, both theoretical and practical, into the most fundamental of all human relationships—the basic element of the family, civil society, and the whole range of intermediate associations—by discussing some notable studies and experiences of friendship in philosophical literature. Primary focus is on the origin and nature of friendship, and its different expressions in human life, individual and collective.

The brevity of the course precludes extensive reading, but it is expected that students will want to read in the future some of the authors they meet. Manifestly the subject matter has great and continuing importance for everyone, especially those “to whom more has been given.” Each person profits from the insights of others while extending his personal knowledge and experience and developing insights of his own.

Deliciae meae esse cum filiis hominum.—Prov. 8:31

SOURCES
(emphasis on those in boldface)

Ancient Period: CLASSES 2 AND 3

+ 1. The Epic of Gilgamesh (c. 2700 B.C., Sumerian).

**Medieval Period:** CLASS 4


+ 7. St. Augustine, *Confessions*, books IV (7-14), VI (11-26); *The City of God*, book XIX (5-9); *Epistolae* CCLVIII: To Marcianus (400, 426 A.D., Roman Christian); ref: M. A. McNamara, *Friends and Friendship for St. Augustine* (1964).


**Early Modern Period:** CLASS 5


**Late Modern Period:**


Contemporary: CLASSES 6 AND 7


+ indicates materials available for consultation; ten are included in Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. M. Pakaluk (1991)

SOME EXEMPLARY FRIENDSHIPS

1. Jacques and Raïssa Maritain [philosopher, poet] CLASS 8


2. **John Adams and Thomas Jefferson [statesmen]**


“I thank you, Sir, very sincerely for writing to me upon this Occasion. It was high time that you and I should come to an explanation with each other. The friendship that has subsisted for fifteen Years between Us without the smallest interruption, and until this occasion without the slightest Suspicion, ever has been and still is, very dear to my heart. There is no office which I would not resign, rather than give a just occasion to one friend to forsake me. Your motives for writing to me, I have not a doubt were the most pure and the most friendly; and I have no suspicion that you will not receive this explanation from me in the same candid Light....I thank you, Sir, for...the repeated Assurances of the friendship, Esteem and respect of Dear Sir Your most obedient and most humble servant.”—John Adams, Braintree, July 29, 1791

“There are few Men now living, if any, who know more of me than you do. Yet you know but little of the Life I have led, the hazards I have run, or the ‘light Afflictions for a moment’ I have endured. I will conclude this grave solemn Letter with a merry Story: but as true as it is diverting.”—Adams, Quincy, July 12, 1813

3. **James Boswell and Samuel Johnson [literati]**


“You are pleased to shew me, that my kindness is of some consequence to you. My heart is elated at the thought. Be assured, my dear Sir, that my affection and reverence for you are exalted and steady. I do not believe that a more perfect attachment ever existed in the history of mankind. And it is a noble attachment; for the attractions are Genius, Learning, and Piety....I ever am, my dear Sir, your most obliged and faithful, humble servant.”—James Boswell, Edinburgh, Feb. 24, 1777
4. St. Thomas More and Erasmus [philosophers; poets; statesmen; literati]

Excerpted from The Correspondence of Sir Thomas More, ed. E.F. Rogers (1947):

“The most pleasant experience of my entire trip was my personal relationship with your host, Peter Gilles of Antwerp; his learning, his wit, his modesty, his genuine friendliness are such that, bless my soul, I would be happy to pay a good part of my wealth to purchase the companionship of that one man. Farewell, my dearest Erasmus, and give my regards to Rhenanus and Lystrius, who, because of your recommendation and their own writings, are dearer and even more intimately known to me than are many of the people with whom I have daily contact. Notice how quick I am to copy your habits.”—More, London, Feb. 17, 1516

“I expect that those men will also give their approval to my work [Utopia], and I am very anxious to have it. However, if a deep conviction to the contrary has been implanted in their minds by satisfaction with their present good fortune, then your one vote will be more than adequate to influence my decision. To my way of thinking, we two are a crowd, and I think I could be happy with you in any forsaken spot. Farewell, dearest Erasmus, more precious to me than my own eyes!”—More, London, Oct. 31, 1516

“The more I realize that this post [Lord Chancellor] involves the interests of Christendom, my dearest Erasmus, the more I hope it all turns out successfully, for your sake rather than my own. Farewell, dearest Erasmus, more than half of my soul.”—More, Chelsea, Oct. 28, 1529

“My dear Erasmus, we are not all Erasmuses; the gracious gift which God has granted to you, practically alone of all mankind, that gift all of us must wait to receive.”—More, Chelsea, June 14, 1532

Concluding Symposium CLASS 9
Discussion of readings assigned to students (from the boldface selections).

“We have reason to be satisfied if we can find a few true friends.”—Aristotle
Inauthentic (Self-Serving) Attitudes (Habits) which Threaten/Prevent Friendships:

1. Disillusionment over an apparent scarcity of kindred souls

2. Superficiality resulting from a random craving for numerous friends

3. Conformism and a renunciation of active, creative participation

4. Possessive utilitarianism: using others to advance one’s self-interest
5. Individualistic disengagement, alienation, separation from others

6. Functionalism due to immersion in impersonal, mechanical bureaucracies

7. Taking others for granted or using them as a mere diversion from serious pursuits.

Authentic (Self-Giving) Attitudes (Habits) which Foster/Secure Friendships:

1. Cultivating similarities of aspiration by carefully choosing companions

2. Vigilant spontaneity: recognizing and seizing unexpected opportunities

3. Solidarity of outlook: searching for and creating occasions for collaboration with others

4. Readiness to practice the “good manners” of spending time with others and finding ways to help them

5. Practicing the good example of virtue so that it can be recognized and emulated by others

6. Discovering how “loyal dissent” enables friends to correct each other—energetically, when necessary
7. Faithfulness to prayer and contemplation that centers everything in God

Two Approaches to Friendship:

First—Understanding what it is: The OBJECTIVE approach of REALISM

1. Theoretical basis: classical ontology (focus on human nature, essence)

2. Practical basis: classical ethics (focus on character formation in virtue)

3. *Philia, amicitia (amor amicitiae)* as social paths toward the development and perfection of a natural inclination for companionship based on common interests, quests (i.e., “seeing the same truth”)

4. The substance of friendship: a common desire for and pursuit of the good (end) of human nature (happiness shared)

5. The growth of friendship: constant sharing strengthens and raises each partner above individual limitations (“ecstasy”)

6. Some key elements of friendship: basic similarities in life, character, and pursuits; mutual appreciation, esteem; unconditional commitment; reciprocal good will; intensity as developed by frequency of association; mutual trust, confidence; nobility, dignity

7. Some effects of friendship (as each molds the other(s) to fuller maturity of character): union of likeness; mutual indwelling (spontaneous understanding); zealous resistance to all that opposes the good of the other(s)

8. Friendship and human virtues: “Prudence directs it, justice rules it, fortitude guards it, temperance moderates it.”

9. The classical definition (Cicero): “Complete agreement about all things, human and divine, with benevolence and affection....Feelings of affection spring from our very nature; goodwill comes into being when we have seen clear signs of virtue. Men who make virtue their goal in life turn toward each other and grow closer and closer.... This sends a ray of good hope into the future, and keeps our hearts from faltering.”
10. The classical conclusion (Aristotle): “Whatever is a man’s purpose in life, whatever he likes most, that is the activity he wishes to pursue in the company of friends. And so some drink together, others play games, engage in sports, or go hunting, while still others practice philosophy.

Second—Putting it into practice: The SUBJECTIVE approach of PERSONALISM

1. Theoretical basis: modern phenomenology (focus on the person, experience)

2. Practical basis: modern anthropology (focus on communion)

3. Philia, amicitia, amor amicitiae as social paths toward the development and perfection of a communion of minds and hearts which enriches all that one is and has by giving it freely to (an)other person(s); personhood is preserved as it is transcended

4. The substance of friendship: a gratuitous, reciprocal divine gift, an undeserved and unmerited privilege of souls whose self-possession enables them to donate themselves to the other(s)

5. The growth of friendship: how this happens is a natural mystery of the Providence of God, who uses it as an instrument in His work of revealing, recreating, and saving

6. Some key elements of friendship: reverence for the other(s) as higher spiritual selves; the affective participation of sharing the humanity of the other(s); correspondence of responsibility; sharing of sentiments (“sympathy”)

7. Some effects of friendship: each one discovers more of himself as he discovers more of the other(s), with common action as the medium; risks of suffering, which are accepted in advance as opportunities for self-sacrifice and purification on the way to self-transcendence

8. Friendship and the theological virtues: “Religion directs it, charity rules it, hope guards it, faith moderates it.”

9. A new classical definition (Wojtyła): “Willingness of one man to sacrifice all particular interests, enabling him to realize his own value, which becomes greater and worthier through the pursuit of a common interest with others....The man realizes the value of his own person through spiritual generation as the other man accepts and realizes that same value; acting together, one carries in himself the person of the other and at the same time is carried by him.”
10. A new classical conclusion (Saint-Exupéry): “A friend is unique in all the universe.”

**A synthesis of the two**

Friendship participates in a vital unity that runs through and transcends the universe: What begins in the nature of man is perfected supernaturally in Jesus Christ: The perfecting of *philìa/amor amicitiae* and *charitas* which begins on earth is consummated in heaven.

**Previous examination questions**

...Probed each student’s personal discoveries about transferring the theory of friendship into the practice of friendship...
...by testing his ability to select among and combine the principles presented in class while considering actual opportunities and limitations drawn from experience.

**Previous student insights and questions**

1. Friendship is providential in that it participates in the divine plan for a person. God is the protagonist of every genuine friendship. He arranges them in His own way as key elements in our path to holiness.

2. Friends are fellow pilgrims, helping each other to complete an arduous journey, the climb toward the *summum bonum*.

3. Friendship both requires and fosters personal conversion. It helps us to see our defects more clearly and to correct them more decisively.

4. Insofar as it lies beyond our complete understanding and control, friendship is mysterious. Each friend is somehow a mystery to himself and to the other.

5. In friendship, “agreement about *things* human and divine” becomes agreement about *Persons* human and divine. When two persons become friends, the value of each person is enhanced, but not of the things which attract their interest.

6. Therefore, one not only discovers his human identity in and through friendship, but also his “divine” identity. And not only his original identity, but what he comes to be. By opening ourselves to others, we discover who we really are and who we are becoming.
7. Can friendship alter one’s personal identity by moving one from who he is now to who God wants him to be?

8. The emphasis in friendship is not on the what (common interests), but on the who (kindred spirits).

9. A chemical analogy with friendship: In the formation of a salt crystal, an ion gives and receives electrons; its sharp edges remain, but form a well-ordered whole. The sharing of electrons is active, interactive. They can also attract others outside the crystal in a supersaturated solution—attract more members to the whole—and the crystal grows.

10. In friendship the focus is always on the other, not the self. Friendship formation is a process of getting over selfishness, an on-going effort to identify and overcome flaws caused by our imperfections. In this life no friendship is ever completely perfected.

11. Friendship, like every virtue, can grow or diminish; it is never static, never completed. It moves toward or away from the goal of the perfect ideal of the mean. What gives a friendship its particular character is the path it takes.

12. Beyond that human dimension is the supernatural one: God starts and aids the formation of this and every virtue by means of divine grace. Thus a purely human professional bond can be transformed into a spiritual one.

13. Since friendship arises on the basis of human nature, both a capacity for friendship and barriers to its development come from within. So the nature has to be disciplined: the capacity enlarged, and the barriers diminished.

14. Friendship and freedom: As we grow in consciousness of the other as loveable, friendship frees us from our natural need to be loved, our natural dependence on others.

15. True friendships are never possessive, due to a growing respect for each one’s honor and dignity.

16. Friendship lies at the heart of our spiritual desires, which it purifies and brings to a higher level.