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Tutorial 12: Non-competitive Labor Markets (cont.)

 

An Application -- The Employment Effect of a Minimum Wage

In this part of Tutorial 12, we apply both models of the labor market -- with and without wage-setting power -- to study the impact of a minimum wage. The question that guides our application is "Does the minimum wage increase hiring in covered labor markets or does it produce unemployment?"

 

A Two-sector Model of Labor Employment

In Tutorial 3e we learned that attempts to regulate the market price in order to produce a "more fair" price (for at least one group) lead to a loss of social surplus. A minimum wage is an example of such an attempt. To review, a minimum wage is a "price floor" (or a "price support"), a legal minimum price, set by the government, to hold wage rates above that determined by the market for labor. For simplicity, we will divide the market for this type of labor into two sectors, one sector covered by the minimum wage ("Covered Sector") and one "Not Covered Sector". Figures 3 and 4 offer illustrations of each. Before the government imposes a minimum wage, the competitive wage, W*, is $100 per unit and the competitive level of hiring, L*, is 200 units per time period (t).

Suppose the government sets a minimum wage in the covered sector (Min w) at $130 per unit of labor. At that wage, the quantity of labor demanded is 140 and the quantity of labor supplied is 260 units/t. This leaves a labor surplus of 120 units/t.

 

Figure 3 - Covered Sector


Graph showing the minimum wage imposed on a competitive labor market (the covered sector).

 

Suppose the "units" in this market are workers. That means that establishing a minimum wage has resulted in 120 workers who are unable to find work. Of those, (200 - 140) = 60 workers had a job but were laid off when the market decreased the quantity of labor demanded as wages rose. The remaining 60 workers entered the market attracted to the increase in wages only to find that no additional jobs were available. Both groups are part of the unemployed, however.

Some of these 120 workers will seek work in markets not covered by the minimum wage. The result of their migration is shown in Figure 4. The supply of labor increases as workers enter this market "not covered" by the minimum wage. The increase in supply drives wages down to $80 per unit, and does increase hiring to 240 units/t.

 

Figure 4


Graph showing the impact on the non-covered sector of the labor market of a minimum wage imposed on the covered sector).

 

So a minimum wage will generate unemployment in the covered sector and reduce wages in the uncovered sector. Although not the goal of the legislation governing minimum wages, it is a logical outcome!

 

Minimum Wage and Monopsony Top of page.

But suppose the market for labor is not made up of a large number of independent labor buyers with no wage-setting power. Suppose the labor market in the covered sector is best described as a monopsony. Will the result of a minimum wage be different? Let's use the labor market model developed in this Tutorial and see if our conclusion changes. Figure 5 offers an illustration.

Before the imposition of a minimum wage, the wage rate in this market, W*, is $100 per unit and the wage-setting firm hires, L*, 20000 units of labor per period. (Note: Although these numbers are the same as in the previous example, remember that they are the result this firm exercising its wage-setting power to reduce wages and hiring below competitive market conditions.) A government set minimum wage, Min w, forces the firm to be a wage taker. The dashed lines now show the firms new S and ME curves. Along the horizontal portion of the dashed line, w = ME. Where that line hits the market supply curve shows us how many workers the firm will be able to hire at the minimum wage rate it must pay. That number is about 26000 units of labor per period. [Why would the firm hire 26000 workers? Following the vertical portion of the dashed line we see that even the last worker hired has a MRP greater than the wage rate. This means that the firm is still earning a profit on this, and all previous, workers hired. Profit is not a a maximum here, but it is still positive!]

So imposition of a minimum wage in a labor market controlled by a monopsonist results in an increase in hiring from 20000 to 26000 units/t.

 

Figure 5


Graph showing imposition of a minimum wage under monopsony hiring conditions.

 

Conclusion Top of page.

We started this inquiry with the question "Does the minimum wage increase hiring in covered labor markets or does it produce unemployment?" The answer, as often is true in economic analysis, is "It depends...". On the one hand, if the sector of the labor market covered by a minimum wage is perfectly competitive, then a minimum wage will cause an increase in unemployment among those workers whose income such a wage was designed to increase. On the other hand, if the sector of the labor market covered by a minimum wage is a monopsony, then a minimum wage will cause an increase in employment, and with that, an increase in the incomes of the workers as intended.

 


 

The End!

This concludes the Tutorials for this course! Now it's time to put together what you have learned about the operation of competitive markets in both Tutorial 9 and Tutorial 11. In Project 4, you will explore the interactions between the competitive market for products and the competitive market for labor. Using an Excel workbook to model the interactions, you will answer a series of questions that asks why the models behaves as they do in response to a change in the markets' initial conditions.